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(De)Constructing the Nazi State: Criminal 
Organizations and the Constitutional Theory 
of the International Military Tribunal 
DAVID FRASER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The place of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nu-
remberg for both historical and legal scholarship is not yet beyond 
doubt as we approach the seventieth anniversary of the proceedings.1 
Some claim that, despite its many acknowledged shortcomings, the IMT 
occupies a place of singular importance for both lawyers and historians. 
The trial itself, and other international criminal proceedings, has be-
come the object of a sub-genre of the historical study of “war crime tri-
als.” Additionally, the efforts of the prosecution at Nuremberg to mount 
a detailed document-based case against the accused leaders of the Hitler 
regime, created a treasure trove of Nazi era documents that provides the 
basis for ongoing historical inquiry into many aspects of the period be-
tween 1933–1945.2 The extraordinary process at Nuremberg not only 
occupies a significant place of historians of the Nazi and post-war peri-
ods, but it sits, in most accounts, as the fountainhead of the evolution of 
what we now know as “international criminal law.” As Michael Bazyler 
 
∗   David Fraser is Professor of Law and Social Theory at the University of Nottingham. He 
has taught at universities in Australia, Canada, France, and the United States. His research inter-
ests include Jewish legal history generally and law and the Shoah. His The Fragility of Law: Con-
stitutional Patriotism and the Jews of Belgium, 1940-1945 received the Socio-Legal Studies As-
sociation best book award and his article, co-authored with Professor Frank Caestecker of the 
University of Ghent, “Jews or Germans? Nationality Legislation and the Restoration of Liberal 
Democracy in Western Europe after the Holocaust” was awarded the Surrency Prize by the 
American Society for Legal History. His most recent works include “Honorary Protestants”: The 
Jewish School Question in Montreal, 1867-1997 and Daviborshch’s Cart: Narrating the Holo-
caust in Australian War Crimes Trials. 
 1. See generally TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946 (NUREMBERG 1947). 
 2. See generally MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945–46: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (St. Martin’s Press 1997). 
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has argued, the Nuremberg trials put the ideas of genocide, and more 
specifically, crimes against humanity on the agenda of international 
law.3 Others are somewhat more skeptical about the contribution of the 
Nuremberg proceedings to our historical understanding of the nature 
and function of the Nazi period in Germany or throughout occupied Eu-
rope, or as a basis for a proper legal representation of the Hitler regime. 
For those like Donald Bloxham, the Nuremberg trials do not offer 
the insights claimed by Marrus, nor do they provide a real jurispruden-
tial setting for the development of international law. Adherents of this 
particular interpretative position argue that, due to the flaws in the evi-
dence  as well as the weakness of the legal and jurisprudential founda-
tions for many of the claims proffered by the prosecuting authorities at 
Nuremberg, simply cannot serve as a valid bases for any positive as-
sessment of the trials and their aftermath.4 Moreover, the adherents of 
this broad view reject the idea that, with particular reference to the Hol-
ocaust, the IMT proceedings were, or are, of particular significance, ei-
ther in relation to the historical understanding of the Shoah, or of the 
correct legal construction of the Nazi attempt to exterminate European 
Jewry. The inherent limitations of the conception of “crimes against 
humanity”—dependent upon their connection with “war crimes” or 
“crimes of aggression” at Nuremberg—create a legal roadblock to un-
derstanding the uniqueness of the Shoah by making extermination sub-
servient to other, more traditional international criminal law offences. 
As a matter of historiography, or of socio-legal history, this means that 
the reality of the prosecution’s case was focused on these more accepted 
violations of the international legal order, which in turn led to a con-
comitant lack of focus on the killing of European Jews as a separate and 
core phenomenon of the Nazi regime. On these and related points, the 
debate is far from closed. 
Together with a growing literature on the IMT proceedings, in-
creasing attention is being paid to the subsequent trials heard before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal.5 Works by Kevin Jon Heller and Kim 
Priemel, in particular, have added to the substantive discussions of these 
questions among legal scholars and historians.6 While much remains to 
 
 3. See generally MICHAEL BAZYLER, THE HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE AND THE LAW: THE 
QUEST FOR JUSTICE IN A POST-HOLOCAUST WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
 4. See generally DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND 
THE FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY (2001). 
 5. See generally TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 
1949). 
 6. See generally KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE 
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be done in terms of a more complete socio-legal history of the Nazi re-
gime, and of the Shoah in particular, lawyers and historians are now 
more focused on the rich material created by post-war prosecuting au-
thorities, and on the legal proceedings against Nazi officials and collab-
orators in different countries of occupied Europe, in an effort to create a 
more comprehensive socio-legal history of the 1933–1945 period gen-
erally, and of the Holocaust specifically.7 
It is not my intention to offer a detailed historical or legal addition 
to this literature on the Shoah, or to provide a detailed analysis or cri-
tique of the strengths and weaknesses of the IMT proceedings. My goal 
is much more limited and narrowly focused, at least at first blush. My 
attention is directed towards what I consider to be a neglected, but im-
portant, aspect of the IMT proceedings which I believe could offer new 
and important insights into the broader questions regarding the value 
and place of the Nuremberg Trials and about the core goals and func-
tions of legal and jurisprudential analysis of the Nazi regime. Again, 
there is a growing, but still minority, literature on the significance of 
law within Nazi Germany in general,8 and, more particularly, on the in-
stantiation of the Shoah.9 My focus is not on the debates and issues that 
continue to agitate the world of jurisprudential concern over whether 
Nazi law is or was law as we might want to understand it, although 
much of what follows in this brief, and necessarily somewhat cursory 
investigation, will feed into those debates in—what I hope is—an im-
portant way. My attention will be on interrelated aspects of the legal 
history of the IMT proceedings against major Nazi war criminals, as-
pects that have been submerged, and perhaps even ignored, in all the 
debates that have surrounded the Nuremberg Trials.  In particular, I will 
focus on legal concerns about retrospective norms, victors’ justice, and 
the imposition of individual liability for crimes committed in a hereto-
fore state-centric system of international law. 
It appears to be often forgotten that the IMT considered more than 
just the individual guilt of the accused named in relation to crimes of 
 
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2011); REASSESSING THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRIAL NARRATIVES, AND 
HISTORIOGRAPHY (Kim C. Primel & Alexa Stiller eds., Berghahn Books 2014). 
 7. See generally David Fraser, Shadows of Law, Shadows of the Shoah: Towards a Legal 
History of the Nazi Killing Machine, 32 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 401 (2011). 
 8. See generally MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON 
LEGAL HISTORY IN NAZI GERMANY (Thomas Dunlap trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998); INGO 
MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (I.B. Tauris 1991).  
 9. See generally Shadows of Law, supra note 7; DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ: 
TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLOCAUST (Carolina Academic Press 2005). 
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aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, conspiracy to commit, 
or planning such crimes. Another important part of the prosecution’s 
case was brought against organizations: those corporate, collective bod-
ies, believed to have been at the heart of the structure of the Nazi appa-
ratus that planned and perpetrated the substantive offences of which the 
individual defendants stood accused. Each of the accused was identified 
in terms of his membership, leadership, and active involvement in these 
various organizations. The prosecution’s case, against both the individ-
ual defendants and the organizations charged as “criminal” participants, 
was founded in the core idea that the defendants and the organizations 
they represented, participated in a vast criminal enterprise, the purposes 
of which were to plan and then carry out various violations of interna-
tional legal prohibitions against aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. The organizations named and pursued by the prose-
cuting authorities at Nuremberg were selected because of their central 
place in the criminal apparatus of the Nazi regime. 
Naturally, the decision to bring criminal indictments against entire 
organizations raised significant legal issues. There were broad concerns 
about retrospectivity and victors’ justice that informed legal and juris-
prudential concerns about the trials generally. In addition, the idea of 
prosecuting organizations as criminal raised more specific legal and ju-
risprudential questions that continue to arise today. To some extent, as 
shall become more clear in what follows, both in fact and in law, the or-
ganizations were not in reality “convicted” in the traditional sense of the 
word. Instead, the Tribunal entered a declaration of criminality against 
the collective found to have been a participant in one or more of the 
crimes named in the indictment. This, in turn, would then have legal 
consequences—explored below—on later individual criminal defend-
ants. 
I believe that the choice to select organizations for prosecution as 
“criminal” groups offers potentially important insights into how the 
prosecution at Nuremberg, and the governments of the victorious and 
occupying powers they represented, conceived of and constructed the 
Nazi state itself. The prosecution of the named alleged “criminal organ-
izations” opens up intriguing and important possibilities for us to begin 
to understand the constitutional jurisprudence of the IMT. This is im-
portant for at least three obvious reasons. First, it allows us at first blush 
to understand the prosecution’s understanding of the nature of the Nazi 
state—an understanding that informed the prosecution of the individuals 
and organizations charged at Nuremberg. This in turn may permit us, 
after more detailed study, to further explore the bases for the prosecu-
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tion of major (and other) war criminals in the postwar period and to fur-
ther clarify the criminal charges brought against alleged Nazi criminals 
from both historical and socio-legal perspectives. 
Secondly, the insights about the construction and understanding of 
the Nazi state that informed the Nuremberg (and other) prosecutions al-
low us to situate more precisely, both judicially and historically, the 
IMT proceedings in their own particular moment.  The question is one 
that goes both to a fuller understanding of how the Nazi state was un-
derstood and portrayed by the prosecution authorities at Nuremberg, 
and, more importantly I believe, to test that construction against the rest 
of the historical and legal records of the portrayal and positioning of the 
Nazi state at other important and relevant historical moments. The Hit-
ler regime existed in Germany between 1933 and 1945, a twelve-year 
period in which it functioned as the government of an internationally 
recognized nation state. The questions that arise for further inquiry are 
how and why an otherwise “legitimate” state became a “criminal state,” 
how that evolution and changing characterization informed the IMT 
prosecution, and how, or if, the IMT prosecution itself changed that 
characterization. 
Thirdly, a study of the legal and constitutional theory behind the 
IMT and other trials in the postwar period may allow for more subtle 
and contextualized understandings of the Nuremberg and subsequent 
proceedings in their broader political and historical circumstances. De-
spite the centrality of the criminal law paradigm at the heart of these 
cases, the judicial proceedings also carried important pedagogical mes-
sages for a number of audiences, such as Germany, other European 
countries, and North America. The construction of the Nazi state, its 
proper political, ideological, and legal characterizations asserted, and to 
some extent confirmed, in the criminal organizations trial, were under-
stood in different ways by different audiences, particularly in Germa-
ny.10 Moreover, the reception and understandings of the IMT changed 
and mutated over time so that a contextualized account of this important 
aspect of the Nuremberg proceedings can serve as a starting off point 
for useful and more developed historical-legal debates.11 The lead 
 
 10. See generally Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 800 (2006); Knut Wolfgang Nörr, From Codification to Constitution: On the 
Changes of Paradigm in German Legal History of the Twentieth Century, 60 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 145 (1992). 
 11. Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-examining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution: Politics, Cul-
ture and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 
454 (2005); see generally Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg and American Justice, 5 NOTRE DAME 
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 951 (1991). 
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American prosecutor was clear in his belief that the criminal organiza-
tions aspect of the case against the Nazis and their state apparatus was 
central to the overarching aims of the prosecution, and, in particular to 
the desire to punish, under the protective umbrella of the legality under 
which the IMT was sheltered, those who had so blatantly breached the 
existing international norms prohibiting crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. For Justice Robert Jackson, 
In administering retributive justice, it would be possible to exonerate 
these organizations only by concluding that no crimes have been 
committed by the Nazi regime. Their sponsorship of every Nazi pur-
pose and their confederation to execute every measure to attain those 
ends is beyond denial. A failure to condemn these organizations un-
der the terms of the Charter can only mean that such Nazi ends and 
means cannot be considered criminal, and that the Charter of the Tri-
bunal is considered a nullity.12 
In other words, the question I wish to raise is primarily one that 
goes to how the IMT understood, or created an understanding of the ju-
ridical nature of the Nazi state. This precise question of constitutional 
law and jurisprudence has received little or no detailed attention in the 
myriad discussions and analyses of the Nuremberg trials. Yet it would 
appear that a historically informed and accurate understanding of the 
very nature of the Nazi state was at the heart of the proceedings, which 
indicted and prosecuted both individuals and organizations for the role 
they were alleged to have played in the functioning of the Nazi regime. 
Removed from the trials themselves, the next question that must also be 
posed concerns what the historical and legal understandings of the Nazi 
state before the Nuremberg trials were. In answering this second ques-
tion, one might begin by comparing and contrasting, in the appropriate 
legal and historical contexts, the characterizations of the Nazi state at 
different historical junctures and under different legal frameworks. This 
comparison will allow us to understand the precise way in which the 
IMT proceedings—in terms of the indictments, the evidence, and the 
IMT’s judgment on the “criminal organizations” question—constructed 
a vision and constitutional understanding of the Nazi state, that may 
have differed, as I believe it did, from that of other historical times and 
under different sets of legal understandings. This inquiry thus demands 
that we investigate the “correctness” of the IMT characterization. Fur-
ther, we must investigate by asking important theoretical and practical 
questions about how the creation of a “criminal state” at the IMT 
 
 12. Robert H. Jackson, The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations Are Accused of Being 
Criminal, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 371, 389 (1945). 
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through the organizations part of the prosecution has influenced subse-
quent historical and legal understandings of the Nazi state. Finally, we 
must inquire into how the idea of a “criminal state,” arguably developed 
and concretized at Nuremberg, may have played important roles in sub-
sequent international legal investigations and events. Again, it is not my 
intention to fully answer these questions or to even engage in the exten-
sive and detailed examination of the proof and evidence advanced 
against the organizations before the IMT. Instead, I simply wish to out-
line the constitutive function of the prosecution of the so-called “crimi-
nal organizations” at Nuremberg in order to point out how and why this 
understudied aspect of the trials against Nazi officials is more deserving 
of our legal and historical inquiry and understanding. 
The prosecution of Nazi officials and organizations, both before 
the IMT and the subsequent proceedings of the NMT, were not neces-
sarily grounded in a clear and coherent jurisprudential or historical un-
derstanding of the Nazi state, or of the nature of legality under the Na-
zis.13 Therefore, I am not suggesting that the prosecution had a worked 
through, solid, and intellectually grounded “theory” of the Nazi state 
and its constitution. Nonetheless, the prosecution did have very specific 
ideas about the acts and activities of the accused and of the organiza-
tional structures of “government” within the Nazi regime, and about the 
aims of those activities. From these understandings, and the arguments 
made by the prosecution, we can, in fact, glean the basic and core ele-
ments of a constitutional jurisprudence that informed the understanding 
of the Nazi state by the Allied powers. Indeed, it is only if we address 
the question of the constitutional law of the Nazi state that we can begin 
to understand the basis of the prosecution’s cases against the individual 
and organizational defendants before the IMT. The combination of the 
“conspiracy” and “planning” elements of the indictments shows us quite 
clearly how the Allied lawyers understood the processes and aims, not 
just of the accused individuals and organizations, but how they per-
ceived the ways in which those aims and implementation processes fig-
ured at the heart of the Nazi state structure. 
By examining the ways in which the prosecution proceeded, how 
the charges were laid, the evidence produced, and, finally, the judg-
ments reached, we may be able to find not just only direct indications of 
the underlying constitutional theory of the IMT proceedings, but also 
draw clear inferences from these same elements about the legal and his-
torical construction of the Nazi state at the Nuremberg trials. This arti-
 
 13. See generally David Fraser, Evil Law, Evil Lawyers?: From the Justice Case to the Tor-
ture Memos, 3 JURIS. 391 (2012). 
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cle will begin the process of engaging in a careful and historically accu-
rate study, not just only of the nature of the state as the epitome of total-
itarian regimes, but of the ways in which our current understandings of 
these historical issues have been shaped by the prosecution program be-
fore the IMT. 
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The study of the case brought against the so-called “criminal or-
ganizations” at Nuremberg opens up avenues for future research into the 
nature of the Nazi state as revealed at the trial, and significantly, into the 
construction of the Nazi state presented by the prosecution before the 
IMT. A careful and detailed comparison between the two reveals, I be-
lieve, a fundamental flaw in the IMT proceedings, or at least, an in-
stance indicating that we must approach the IMT as a historical and ju-
ridical phenomenon in its own specific legal and historical context. I am 
not suggesting that the entire process of the IMT was fatally weakened 
to such an extent that it must be removed to the garbage can of legal his-
torical inquiry—quite the contrary. Firstly, I believe that an analysis of 
the criminal organizations part of the trials does, in fact, reveal im-
portant and useful information about the nature and functioning of the 
Nazi state, and for lawyers, of the constitutional law system of the Third 
Reich. The fact that the conclusions to be drawn might call into question 
the assertions and presumptions of the case against the various groups 
pursued does not fundamentally undermine the prosecution’s attempt to 
criminalize the organizational structures of the Nazi state. Instead, it 
might also offer a deeper and better understanding of the organizational 
and juridical structures of the state apparatus in Germany between 1933 
and 1945, or even at various points within that period. Secondly, such 
an analysis serves the useful historiographical and jurisprudential func-
tions of studying and understanding the IMT as an institutional process 
set in its own time and context. Most obviously, we now know more 
about the Nazi regime, its functioning, and in particular, about the Hol-
ocaust, than the prosecution authorities could have in 1945–1946. This 
is simply the nature of historical research: new sources are found and 
different intellectual perspectives are proffered concerning existing 
sources. Historical “knowledge” changes and evolves, so it would be 
unrealistic to set out a position in defense of the IMT that would insist 
that it could have offered a definitive and final account of the Nazi state 
and the criminality associated with that regime. 
Finally, of course, it is not necessary to arrive at a conclusion re-
jecting any hint of historical significance or jurisprudential import by 
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insisting on the need for contextualization of the IMT proceedings. The 
Tribunal did not arise out of whole cloth. It was the result of lengthy 
and often heated negotiations among the vanquishing powers.14 Each of 
those powers had its own agenda in relation to the conquest of Germa-
ny, the punishment of perpetrators of international crimes, and the 
(re)establishment of a new Germany. The jurisprudential basis of the 
prosecution was, and for some remains, both problematic and innova-
tive. Germany was devastated; the Tribunal, its investigators, and its 
lawyers worked under very difficult circumstances. To say that the IMT 
process was flawed, or that its authorities perhaps misapprehended 
some of the evidence, or that they underestimated the true scale and 
scope of the Shoah,15 is simply to recognize the difficult circumstances 
and contexts in which the IMT did its work. What is important is the 
way in which the “criminal organization” part of the IMT process can, I 
believe, provide fruitful avenues of investigation into the actual func-
tioning of the Nazi state and its constitutional framework. At the same 
time, it provides a useful object lesson in the need for historians and 
lawyers to the place the IMT proceedings, its assumptions, and its con-
clusions in their own particular context. 
Part of the context in which we must place the “criminal organiza-
tions” aspects of the IMT proceedings is found in the formal legal doc-
uments under which the trial took place, and in the Tribunal’s judg-
ments on the criminal organizations aspects of the charged offenses. Of 
course, a complete analysis of the IMT in this context would also in-
volve a detailed examination of the charges against the named individu-
al defendants in relation to their membership in, and leadership of, the 
organizations. Further, it would also involve a careful study of all of the 
evidence led by the prosecution and defense attorneys not solely in rela-
tion to this question, but more specifically, in relation to the activities of 
the alleged criminal organizations themselves. In this introductory 
study, I shall limit myself to an indication of the most important ele-
ments and questions for the development of a constitutional jurispru-
dence of the Nazi state to be found in the charges brought against the 
bodies themselves. Next, the findings of the IMT will be explored in so 
far as they concern the guilt or innocence of the organizations. I leave 
for another day the study of the roles played by the individual named 
defendants and the evidence adduced in relation to the acts and activi-
ties of the organizations. 
 
 14. See generally ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES 
POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT (1998). 
 15. See generally BLOXHAM, supra note 4, at 93–184. 
08 FRASER .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/17  7:14 PM 
126 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:117 
It goes without saying that a full understanding not just of the 
charges and findings against the organizations would require a detailed 
review of the substantive and inchoate offenses at the heart of the Nu-
remberg proceedings. War crimes, crimes of aggression, crimes against 
humanity, and participation in the planning and execution of those 
crimes, as part of a common plan or criminal conspiracy, are the viola-
tions of international law alleged by the prosecution against both the in-
dividual and corporate defendants at Nuremberg. The substantive con-
tent, or lack thereof, of each of these offenses has been at the heart of 
international legal scholarship in its consideration of the Nuremberg 
Trials. A full-blooded contemporary reconsideration of these “crimes” 
would have to be carried out in order to complete a study of the organi-
zation’s part of the trials and of the constitutional theory of the Nazi 
state emerging therefrom.  However, that too, is an exercise for another 
day. 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal established the 
basic jurisdictional frame for the prosecutions of alleged Nazi war crim-
inals.16 Article 6 set out the international crimes within the remit of the 
Tribunal: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; and (c) crimes 
against humanity. More significant for the Trial as it developed, particu-
larly in the hands of the chief US prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson, 
was the final paragraph of Article 6, which states: 
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to com-
mit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan.17 
As is now well known, the US case in particular would proceed 
along the lines outlined in this last paragraph of the Charter. In other 
words, it was the basic understanding of the Nazi state, and of events 
during World War Two (and leading up to hostilities), that the accused, 
as representatives of the Nazi regime, acted in concert as part of the 
“Common Plan or Conspiracy” to commit acts in violation of interna-
tional law (i.e., crimes against peace by waging aggressive war, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity). The case against the defendants 
was understood as one in which the entire state apparatus of Nazi Ger-
many was a large criminal conspiracy against world peace and against 
civilian populations throughout Europe. While the acts concretizing the 
 
 16. See generally Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 
82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
 17. Id. § II art. 6 
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offences were set in motion with the invasion of Poland in early 1939, 
in effect, the preparatory steps in the conspiracy took place almost im-
mediately following the seizure of the state apparatus and the assump-
tion of power by Hitler in the spring of 1933.  Again, it is not possible 
to detail the case made out by the prosecution about the nature of the 
Nazi regime from Hitler’s rise to power until the unconditional surren-
der of the Reich military in May 1945.18 But the idea of the Nazis en-
gaging in a mass criminal conspiracy to prepare the three substantive 
offences of war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against hu-
manity from the earliest moments of the Third Reich was at the heart of 
the prosecution’s case. 
Justice Jackson, in his opening statement, expressed the broad ju-
risprudential and legal historical understanding that informed the prose-
cution of all of the defendants, including the “criminal organizations:” 
  In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting at 
some time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew could 
be accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their seizure 
of the German State, their subjugation of the German people, their 
terrorism and extermination of dissident elements, their planning and 
waging of war, their calculated and planned ruthlessness in the con-
duct of warfare, their deliberate and planned criminality toward con-
quered peoples,—all these are ends for which they acted in concert; 
and all these are phases of the conspiracy, a conspiracy which 
reached one goal only to set out another and more ambitious one. We 
shall also trace for you the intricate web of organizations which these 
men formed and utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show 
how the entire structure of the offices and officials was dedicated to 
the criminal purposes and committed to the use of the criminal meth-
ods planned by these defendants and their co-conspirators, many of 
whom war and suicide have put beyond reach.19 
The basic and core idea of a Nazi criminal state (Verbrecherstaat) 
was reinforced by the provisions of the Charter relating to the question 
of criminal organizations. Article 9 provides: 
  At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization 
the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the 
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which 
the individual was a member was a criminal organization. 
  After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice 
 
 18. Act of Military Surrender, May 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1957. 
 19. Second Day, Wednesday, 21 November 1945, Morning Session, II TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 
NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 104 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
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as it sees fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make 
such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled 
to apply to the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character 
of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject 
the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct 
in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.20 
Article 10 permitted for the subsequent trials of individual mem-
bers of criminal organizations before national courts of States Party to 
the Charter, and created an irrefutable presumption that “the criminal 
nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not 
be questioned.”21 Finally, Article 11 permitted the national prosecution 
of individuals charged with offenses “other than of membership in a 
criminal group or organization.”22 
It seems evident from the plain text of the Charter that the prose-
cuting authorities saw the criminalization of groups and organizations 
central to the operation of the Nazi state as an essential part of their 
mandate. As with many other aspects of the Nuremberg process, the 
Charter sought to draw a careful line between the necessities of justice 
and fairness on the one hand, and judicial efficiency on the other. Indi-
viduals were given rights not just as criminal defendants charged with 
one of the substantive or inchoate offenses, but also insofar as their 
membership in a criminal organization was concerned. At the same 
time, however, the Charter, by creating the irrebuttable presumption 
about organizational criminality determinations by the IMT in Article 
10, insured that the issue would not be re-litigated in each subsequent 
trial. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it highlighted that member-
ship in a criminal organization was a separate and distinct finding and 
did not preclude the conviction of individuals for their participation in 
other offences. The IMT Charter at this level sought to balance the ac-
cused individual’s rights, judicial economy, and the binding authority of 
the findings of the IMT before other jurisdictions, with the liability of 
individuals and the criminality of organizations, quasi organizations, or 
groups. The core idea was that organizations within the Nazi apparatus 
were themselves guilty of crimes over and above the issue of offenses 
committed by individuals associated with them. 
The basic position and understanding of Nazi criminality outlined 
in the foundational Charter of the IMT was subsequently concretized in 
 
 20. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, § II art. 9. 
 21. Id. § II art. 10. 
 22. Id. § II art. 11. 
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the accused’s indictment.23 Section I of the indictment embodied the 
three substantive violations of international law against the defendants 
as well as the inchoate offense of a “Common Plan or Conspiracy” to 
commit those crimes.  After listing the defendants, section 1 concludes 
with the indication that they are being charged “individually and as 
members of any of the groups or organizations next hereinafter named.” 
The text of the Nuremberg Indictment itself highlights the clear and un-
ambiguous nexus in the understanding of the criminality of the Nazi re-
gime by the prosecuting authorities between individual culpability and 
corporate, collective, and organizational responsibility. But the Indict-
ment at Nuremberg is not entirely unambiguous or without need for fur-
ther study and clarification. 
The notion of a “Common Plan or Conspiracy” between and 
among the named defendants already indicates a conception of Nazi 
criminality involving an important “collective” element. The accused 
were charged with participating in a “Common Plan or Conspiracy” in 
relation to some or all of the three substantive international crimes. 
Concerted agreement and activity between and among the individuals 
are not only necessary elements of the “common plan” as an offense, 
but the idea of such an agreement, and the acts in fulfillment of that 
agreement is, in essence, about the nature of the Nazi state. These re-
maining leaders of the Hitler regime stand accused in section I of the 
indictment of having engaged, as part (if not all) of their official func-
tions, in a vast conspiracy, or in an interconnected series of smaller con-
spiracies, to violate international legal norms.24 
This understanding of the Nazi state, which is portrayed as a vast 
criminal conspiracy, is then concretized in section II of the indictment: 
  The following are named as groups or organizations (since dis-
solved) which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims 
and the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in connec-
tion with the conviction of such of the named defendants as were 
members thereof . . . .25 
At a formal textual level, the indictment of the named organiza-
tions is somewhat confusing, and, to some extent, apparently subsidiary 
 
 23. See generally Indictment, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 
27 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
 24. Judgment, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 224 (Nuremberg, 
1947). 
 25. Indictment, supra note 23, at 28. 
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to the conviction of the accused in section I. The “criminality” of organ-
izations is made dependent upon, in part at least, “the conviction of such 
of the named defendants as were members thereof.”26 In this part of the 
construction of the idea of a Nazi criminal state, the focus appears to 
have been on the leadership of the named organizations in the hands of 
the individual accused. Thus, for example, the second part of section II 
might lead one to believe that the simple conviction of Joachim Von 
Ribbentrop, Hitler’s Foreign Minister, under one or more of the crimes 
in section I, would lead to the declaration of the criminality of the Reich 
Cabinet of which he was apparently a member, or that the SS, in which 
he held the rank of Obergruppenführer, could be declared criminal un-
der section II as the direct result of his conviction. This idea of collec-
tive responsibility of an organization is, or would be, incredibly prob-
lematic under most understandings of criminal liability. 
At the same time, of course, it would also have been consistent 
with an understanding of the Nazi state not just as a vast criminal con-
spiracy, but also as a set of conspiracies led by a hierarchical structure 
within the institutional apparatus of government. Indeed, this would also 
reinforce the ideas implicit in section I of the indictment that the indi-
viduals accused were chosen for the leadership positions they had occu-
pied in the Nazi state apparatus and that they were accused not just of 
the offenses, but of belonging to criminal organizations. Even at its 
most expansive, the criminal organization aspect of the IMT proceed-
ings offers what could be useful insights into the prosecution’s under-
standing the Nazi state, and how it affected the entire prosecution pro-
cess. On the other hand, this part of section II of the indictment appears 
to be somewhat circular in its jurisprudential, criminal, and constitu-
tional law logic. If the accused are charged with belonging to a criminal 
organization, and the organization can be declared criminal based upon 
the conviction of the named accused, for the substantive and inchoate 
offences, then the logical connection between sections I and II is clearly 
circular and of no real value in helping us understand the nature of the 
Nazi state either in reality or as constructed in the prosecution case at 
Nuremberg. 
A more logical and coherent approach is to see the core of section 
II in the first part of the substantive accusation against the organizations 
(i.e. that, “by reason of their aims and means used for the accomplish-
ment thereof,” they were properly characterized as “criminal” enterpris-
es). Indeed, the wording used in this part of the indictment is indicative 
 
 26. Id. 
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of the consistent approach adopted by the prosecuting authorities as part 
of their constitutive theory of the Nazi state. The indictment uses the 
conjunctive “and” between the criminality of the “aims” of the organi-
zations and “the means used for the accomplishment thereof.”27 In other 
words, a plain reading of the indictment indicates that the prosecution 
understood the named organizations as being criminal enterprises by 
origination, as well as by carrying out acts and activities that were 
themselves criminal. This is not a case in which the prosecution is mak-
ing the historical and juridical argument that a legitimate state structure 
was taken over and slowly subverted by the insinuation of criminals and 
criminal aims. From their inception, the named organizations had crimi-
nal aims, and they used criminal means to obtain and achieve their 
goals. As a matter of constitutional law, and perhaps as a matter of po-
litical science and sociology of the Nazi state, this means that the in-
dictment and the evidence proffered by the prosecution to prove these 
allegations about the liability of the criminal organizations in terms of 
their own aims and acts, regardless of the involvement or leadership of 
the individual accused named in section I, were informed by an under-
standing of the Nazi state apparatus from its very beginnings as a revo-
lutionary apparatus organized by a gang of criminals or “gangsters” for 
illegal aims. This was a way of comprehending the Nazi state as a crim-
inal state from its very beginnings. Of course, if we accept the idea that 
the IMT proceedings created a broader public apparatus for understand-
ing Hitler’s Germany and  jurisprudence, there can be little doubt that 
the idea that comes out of the indictment itself is one of an entire state 
apparatus in the hands of criminals from the spring of 1933 until the 
spring of 1945, and, therefore, as an always lawless entity ruled by ruth-
less criminals. 
The importance of this conclusion, and of this informing constitu-
tional and jurisprudential matrix to our understanding of the place and 
function of the IMT and its constitutional jurisprudence of the Nazi state 
as it emerges from the terms of section II of the indictment, is highlight-
ed and enforced when one begins to list the organizations against which 
the prosecution wished to obtain declarations of criminality. The Reich 
Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, (including the 
SD and the Gestapo), the SA, and the General Staff and High Command 
of the German Forces were identified as organizations whose “aims and 
the means for the accomplishment thereof” were declared in the indict-
ment to be “criminal.”28 The structures of the government, police, secu-
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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rity apparatus, military forces, and the Nazi Party leadership constituted 
criminal enterprises which had no other goals or means of accomplish-
ing those goals other than through the violation of international legal 
norms. 
The specific roles, as well as the specifics of the inherent crimi-
nality of each of the named organizations, are set out in more detail in 
Appendix B of the Indictment. The Reich Cabinet was charged with 
having been vested with “legislative, executive, administrative, and po-
litical powers and functions of a very high order in the system of Ger-
man Government,” and, as such, with being responsible for crimes 
committed under each of the named offences.29 Constitutionally, the 
Cabinet was portrayed as a body that had centralized and monopolized 
most of the functions of effective government and governance. For the 
prosecution, the Nazi state was one in which the separation of powers, 
as understood either within the British or American constitutional sys-
tems, had been destroyed under a Nazi party dictatorship under the 
leadership of Hitler. 
The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, in particular, was alleged 
to have been a key aspect behind all of the offenses charged, specifical-
ly in relation to the “constitutive” ideas of significance here of having 
played an active and leading role in the subversion of the German state 
and the takeover of the government apparatus by illegal means and for 
illegal purposes.30 The SS and Gestapo, unsurprisingly, were accused of 
the illegal suppression of the opponents of the Nazi regime and the Nazi 
takeover of the German state, as well as of the active participation in 
acts of oppression and extermination in pursuit of Nazi policies of ag-
gression and racial purity. The SA was likewise accused based on its 
core role as the security arm of the Nazi Party in relation with the crim-
inal takeover of the state, and of subsequent criminal activity in relation 
to all counts of the Indictment.31 Finally, the General Staff and High 
Command were charged with active participation in the planning of 
war, and of the commission of the substantive offences once armed con-
flict had begun. 
The Indictment, and the more detailed accusations in Appendix B, 
portray the Nazi state as one informed by individual and collective 
criminality from its very beginnings. Power was seized illegally and its 
consolidation was carried out by means of force and subversion of law 
led by the Nazi Party and its leadership, namely the Reich Cabinet, the 
 
 29. Id. at 80. 
 30. Id. at 30. 
 31. Id. at 83. 
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SS, Gestapo, and the SA.. All of this was done with the aim of planning 
and then committing acts of war, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity, in the pursuit of the illegal ideological and political aims of the 
Nazi Party, aided and abetted by the military leadership of Germany. 
The constitutional law theory of the charges against the named organi-
zations in section II of the indictment differs little from that which in-
formed the charges against the individuals named in section I. However, 
because section II focuses on the idea that the organizations in their 
very essence, aims, and means of implementation were criminal, it pre-
sents a much clearer idea that the Nazi state was structurally, in its gen-
esis and throughout its existence, a vast criminal enterprise. More pow-
erfully than in the actions and crimes of some named individuals, 
section II offers the idea that the very core of the German state, its polit-
ical and administrative structures, its security apparatus, and its armed 
forces, was from 1933 until 1945, nothing more than a vast conspiracy 
(or again a series of interconnected conspiracies) aimed at violating 
basic norms of civilized collective behavior, and of imposing a violent, 
barbaric, racially informed, New Order, on Europe. 
III. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The final judgment of the IMT represents a somewhat more so-
phisticated, and temporally nuanced understanding of the Nazi regime, 
and by strong implication, of the constitutional law order of the Third 
Reich than that presented by the prosecution. In particular, the way in 
which the Tribunal dealt with the issues arising from the prosecution of 
the organizations reveals a careful attempt to grasp the roles played by 
each organization indicted by the prosecution, and to place those groups 
within the structures and context of the Nazi regime’s crimes against in-
ternational law. 
In order to streamline the proceedings, the Tribunal appointed 
Commissioners to hear evidence in the organization part of the proceed-
ings and, in the end, those Commissioners obtained oral testimony from 
101 witnesses, received 1,809 affidavits, and submitted six written re-
ports to the IMT summarizing the evidence from a large number of oth-
er affidavits.32 Thirty-eight thousand affidavits signed by over 155,000 
people were submitted on behalf of the political leaders of the Nazi Par-
ty; 136,213 for the SS; ten thousand for the SA; seven thousand for the 
SD; two thousand for the Gestapo; and three thousand supporting the 
High Command. In addition, the IMT itself heard twenty-two witnesses 
 
 32. Judgment, supra note 24, at 172. 
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on behalf of the different organizations, and received and reviewed 
thousands of documents submitted in relation to the case involving the 
question of collective liability.33 In other words, a massive judicial in-
quiry was undertaken on the criminal organizations aspect of the IMT 
and the findings of the Tribunal on this part of the proceedings against 
Nazi war criminals were clearly evidence-based. 
The Tribunal considered the charges against each of the organiza-
tions and came to conclusions in their regard that allow us a glimpse in-
to the constitutional jurisprudence that emerged from the Tribunal’s un-
derstandings of the place of each group in the structure and functions of 
the Nazi state. Again, it is important to underline that the Indictment it-
self referred to the organizations as criminal in their “aims” and in the 
actions they undertook to concretize their nefarious goals. The criminal 
law basis of the Tribunal’s analyses of the guilt or innocence of the or-
ganizations was set out in the following terms: 
  A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in 
that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There 
must be a group bound together and organized for a common pur-
pose. The group must be formed or used in connection with the 
commission of crimes denounced in the Charter.34 
In so far as the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was concerned, 
the Tribunal found that the aims of the organization were to help the 
Party gain and maintain control over the German State.35 The Tribunal 
determined that the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was active in 
maintaining German control over occupied territories and in relation to 
the systems of harsh penal governance in those territories. Most im-
portantly, the Tribunal found that there was nothing criminal in the 
Leadership’s role in the “consolidation of control of the Nazi Party,” 
because this did not constitute participation in a criminal conspiracy to 
wage aggressive war.36 In fact, the Tribunal in its general analyses of the 
aggressive war planning aspect of the conspiracy/common plan part of 
the indictment, had focused on a series of planning meetings that had 
taken place between 1937–1939.37 
This meant that the Tribunal rejected the idea put forward by parts 
of the prosecution case that the Nazi regime, and the Party Leadership 
as a key part of that regime, had been a simple criminal conspiracy led 
 
 33. Id. 
34   Id. at 256. 
 35. Id. at 258. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 188. 
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by a bunch of “gangsters” from the very beginning. Instead the Tribunal 
focused on specific acts and plans that could be proven and fit those into 
the definition of the offences alleged to have been committed by the de-
fendants, both individual and organizational. The way in which the Na-
zis came to power was not considered to have been illegal in the sense 
that the Tribunal had to construct that term, i.e. as constituting one of 
the three substantive offenses, crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or most probably in the earliest days of the Nazi 
State, as a conspiracy to commit one of those offences. Once the war 
began, and Germany occupied other European countries, the role played 
by the Leadership Corps became criminal as the Party structure became 
intimately involved in the unlawful occupation policies, including anti-
Jewish persecution, slave labor practices, and the ill treatment of pris-
oners of war.38 
Each of these acts was found to be a violation of the international 
legal regime and the organization itself, encompassing the higher lead-
ership echelons only, was held to be a criminal organization. More im-
portantly, the Tribunal stated that: 
The basis of this finding is the participation of the organization in 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected with the war; 
the group declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who 
had ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding para-
graph prior to 1 September 1939.39 
In other words, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party did not par-
ticipate in a conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humani-
ty before the invasion of Poland, nor did it ever participate in a common 
plan to wage aggressive war or to commit those offences. For the IMT, 
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party became a criminal enterprise on-
ly after World War II began. The IMT’s aims before 1933 and from 
1933 to 1939, as it participated in the consolidation of Nazi power, were 
the elimination of political and ideological opponents; the Nazification 
and Aryanization of the state and the civil society were not “aims” that 
were criminal under international law such that they fell within the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal. This is, of course, an internally legally correct 
position and a valid expression of the jurisdictional and temporal limits 
imposed upon the IMT by its Charter and by the way in which the pros-
ecution of Nazi war criminals proceeded. “Crimes” against German citi-
zens, especially against German Jews, were not within the consideration 
 
 38. Judgment, supra note 24, at 258–61. 
 39. Id. at 262. 
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of the Tribunal because it had to consider only the substantive and in-
choate offenses relating to war crimes, crimes of aggression and against 
peace, and crimes against humanity. This did not mean that it was tem-
porally limited to events after September 1, 1939, because it could con-
sider events leading up to the war as part of the “common plan” allega-
tions. But it did consider that it had to understand the “common plan” or 
“conspiracy” aspect in light of the substantive offences. In doing so, it 
clearly reflected in its judgment about the criminality of the Leadership 
Corps of the Nazi Party. In doing so, the Tribunal clearly rejected the 
idea underlying the prosecution’s broader and more flowery assertions 
of the basic and inherent criminality of the entire Nazi state apparatus as 
a criminal conspiracy. Instead, the Tribunal looked to the evidence and 
found no proof that high-ranking Nazi officials, who very quickly after 
the spring of 1933 had taken control of the German state apparatus, 
were engaged in a common plan to commit war crimes, crimes against 
peace, or crimes against humanity, until after the war had begun. 
The foundational document of the Tribunal itself emphasizes this 
point in so far as crimes against humanity are concerned. It is well 
known that crimes against humanity were only within the remit of the 
IMT if and when they were committed “in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”40 Whatever the 
Leadership Corps, or any other of the charged organizations, may have 
done before the outbreak of the war, could not have been an internation-
al crime unless it was done in furtherance of the substantive crimes, or 
more specifically, since the substantive offences could not have been 
committed until the acts of aggression, etc., had been committed as part 
of the common plan or conspiracy. At this level, the prosecution’s con-
stitutional proposition about the Nazi state as a criminal state, could 
have served as the basis for expanding the liability of the accused to 
“crimes” committed in Germany between 1933 and 1939. Under this 
theory, the Leadership Corps would have been considered “criminal” in 
its aims and in the means used to achieve those aims because it would 
have been a core part of a common plan to wage aggressive war and 
commit war crimes in its very essence. The Particulars of the Nature 
and Development of the Common Plan or Conspiracy clearly set out 
this argument. For Jackson and his colleagues, from its very origins the 
Nazi Party engaged in a single-minded plan to wage war on Europe in 
the name of a racially pure German people.41 
Clearly this “criminal state” vision was rejected by the Tribunal 
 
 40. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 16, at § II art 6(c). 
 41. Indictment, supra note 23, at 30. 
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who chose instead to focus on the post-1939 period. For the judges, the 
Nazi State and the Nazi Party that controlled it, was not criminal per se. 
The consideration by the IMT of the criminality of the Gestapo/SD 
organization echoes these points. While the Tribunal highlighted the 
role played by this group in the police/security apparatus behind the Na-
zi consolidation of power, and even in the persecution and confinement 
in concentration camps of Jews,42 it found that the criminality of the or-
ganization was based in its acts after 1939.43 As was the case with the 
Leadership Corps, the Tribunal limited the criminal responsibility of the 
organization, (and of its members) in precisely the same temporal sense. 
The basis for this finding is the participation of the organization in 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected with the war; 
this group declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who 
had ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding para-
graph prior to 1 September 1939.44 
Despite its emphasis on the Gestapo/SD’s role in the persecution 
and imprisonment of German Jews in 1938 for example, the Tribunal, 
consistent with its understanding of the substantive criminal offences at 
the heart of the charges against all the organizations, confined the 
“criminality” of the security and police apparatus to its acts after the 
war had commenced. Again, within the framework adopted here, this is 
a clear rejection of the prosecution’s thesis that the Nazi state was a 
criminal state, a terror state, from the very beginning. In the strict, and 
of course limited, understandings of criminality underpinning the juris-
diction and the jurisprudence of the IMT, such a thesis could not hold 
water.45 Thus, if it could not hold up against the Gestapo/SD, it would 
likewise fail against the SS. Once more the Tribunal found that the SS, 
including most of its constituent elements, was a criminal organization, 
guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, but limited to the 
time period from the beginning of September 1939. None of the brutali-
ty or acts of oppression committed before that time by the SS could be 
attributed to the organization’s involvement in a common plan or con-
spiracy to commit any of the substantive offences. 
The decision of the Tribunal in relation to the SA, the so-called 
Brownshirts of the Nazi rise to power, is of even greater significance in 
juxtaposing the formal jurisprudence in relation to the Nazi criminal 
state that emerges from the IMT’s judgment and the rhetorical invoca-
 
 42. Id. at 265. 
 43. See id. at 265–268. 
 44. Id. at 268. 
 45. See generally id. at 27–95. 
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tion of collective and unadulterated gangsterism that informed the pros-
ecution’s account. According to the Tribunal, “the SA was a group 
composed in large parts of ruffians and bullies who participated in the 
Nazi outrages of that period.”46 
Most crucially, the Tribunal declared that “[i]t has not been shown, 
however, that these atrocities were part of a specific plan to wage ag-
gressive war, and the Tribunal therefore cannot hold that these activities 
were criminal under the Charter.”47 Therefore, IMT was fully cognizant 
of the atrocities and the brutality of the Nazi regime, as well as the pri-
mary organizational branches of the Hitler state. Yet that awareness did 
not mean that the IMT would, or indeed could, declare, as the prosecu-
tion wished, that each group that played an important role in the Nazi’s 
rise to power, the consolidation of the Nazi state, and the repression of 
its enemies, was a “criminal organization.” Because of the limited and 
limiting nature of the jurisdictional bases for the Tribunal’s very exist-
ence and the restricted number and nature of crimes it could consider, it 
could not, in fact, without ignoring the evidence, accept the prosecu-
tion’s vast criminal conspiracy vision of the Nazi state. Indeed, based on 
the evidence of the “Night of the Long Knives” and the purge of the SA 
in internecine Nazi struggles, the Tribunal did not find that the SA was 
a criminal organization at all.48  As the Tribunal put it, “[a]fter the 
purge, the SA was reduced to the status of a group of unimportant Nazi 
hangers-on.”49 
Like the acquittals of some of the individual defendants, the Tri-
bunal’s refusal to name the SA as a criminal organization because of the 
evidence it had heard, can be seen as an affirmation of the adherence of 
the IMT to the basic principles of the rule of law, the ideals of funda-
mental fairness, and the burden of proof in the criminal law. In the con-
text of the understanding of the Nazi state as a constitutional apparatus 
that emerges from the IMT proceedings, the “acquittal” of the SA 
demonstrates a more sophisticated and temporally nuanced understand-
ing of the Hitler regime than that espoused by the prosecuting authori-
ties. The SA, for all intents and purposes, was wiped out in the “Night 
of the Long Knives.” Therefore, consistent with the IMT’s holdings in 
relation to the other groups, it could not be implicated in crimes against 
 
 46. Id. at 275. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The violent, some would say murderous purge of the SA, often referred to as the Röhm-
Putsch, after the SA leader Ernst Röhm, took place between June 30 and July 2, 1934, and al-
lowed the Nazi regime to consolidate its power and the SS/SD to dominate the state security ap-
paratus. 
 49. Judgment, supra note 24, at 275. 
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humanity, war crimes, or crimes against peace as of September 1939, 
and its corporate existence was more formal than real. Therefore, the 
only possible remaining criminal activity would have been its participa-
tion in the common plan to commit any or all of these substantive of-
fences.  This would only have covered the period at the outside between 
its founding in the 1920’s until its murderous dissolution in 1934. 
The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that the SA, in per-
petrating “Nazi outrages,” had been engaged in any way in a specific 
plan to wage aggressive war. Not only is this a clear and unambiguous 
rejection of the prosecution’s claims that the SA played a key role in 
overall structures of Nazi state’s criminality, but it again reinforces the 
idea that the Tribunal did not accept the foundational notion that the 
Nazi state from its very beginnings, and indeed in the planning stages, 
was a criminal conspiracy aimed at conquering Europe. While no coun-
ter-understanding in any specific way of what the constitutional charac-
ter of the Nazi regime may have been emerges from this part of the IMT 
judgment, the Tribunal’s findings against, or in favor of, the alleged 
“criminal organizations,” marks a clear rejection of the “criminal state” 
theory, at least from 1933–1939. Once the war began, it does seem evi-
dent that the Tribunal in an important way was willing to construct the 
Nazi state and its apparatus as a vast criminal enterprise. 
The finding that no declaration of organizational criminality could 
be entered against the Reich Cabinet is perhaps more instructive on the 
level of the factual understanding of the operation of the Nazi state that 
operated in the Tribunal’s decision-making.50  As the Tribunal stated: 
The Tribunal is of [sic] opinion that no declaration of criminality 
should be made in respect to the Reich Cabinet for two reasons: (1) 
because it was not shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a 
group or organization; (2) because the group of persons here charged 
is so small that members could be conveniently tried in proper cases 
without resort to a declaration that the Cabinet of which they were 
members was criminal.51 
Again, it is probably worth noting that here, the IMT operates un-
der a clear temporal understanding of the offences that it was charged 
within considering. That understanding was not strictly de jure since it 
might have been possible to establish the beginnings of a common plan 
prior to 1937, although the evidence before the Tribunal did not make 
out that case to the satisfaction of the judges. Instead, the Tribunal con-
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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sidered the evidence and determined that the meetings where the com-
mon plan or the conspiracy to wage an aggressive war was concretized 
took place from that date. If the Reich Cabinet did not operate as an or-
ganization with aims or means of putting in place those aims, then it 
could not factually been a party to any conspiracy. 
The Tribunal does however offer some concrete insights as to how 
it understood the operations of the Hitler state at this time. For the Tri-
bunal: 
[I]t is to be observed that from the time that it can be said that a con-
spiracy to make aggressive war existed the Reich Cabinet did not 
constitute a governing body, but was merely an aggregation of ad-
ministrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.52 
It becomes clear at this point that in 1937, the IMT understood the 
Nazi state as one in which the administrative apparatus functioned as a 
structure in which the sole purpose was to implement the will of the 
Fürhrer. Indeed, this is confirmed by the Tribunal’s subsequent state-
ment concerning the actual law-making process of the Third Reich, 
post-1937 that: 
  It does appear, however, that various laws authorizing acts which 
were criminal under the Charter were circulated among the members 
of the Reich Cabinet and issued under its authority signed by the 
members whose departments were concerned. This does not, howev-
er, prove that the Reich Cabinet, after 1937, ever really acted as an 
organization.53 
Not only do we once again find a clear indication that the IMT had 
a particular idea of the nature of a “criminal organization” against which 
it tested the evidence, but we also see the clearly elaborated idea that the 
“organization” was always something more than a (partial) agglomera-
tion of its members. It had a separate existence as a collective undertak-
ing. The simple fact that the Nazi state functioned by way of laws and 
decrees signed and put into formal effect by a Reichsminister with par-
ticular jurisdiction over the matter, did not mean that the Reich Cabinet 
existed or acted as a collective, unitary body, especially after 1937 when 
planning for aggressive war was found to have begun. 
Again, what we know of the constitutional understanding of the 
IMT is gleaned from oblique inferences grounded in concrete findings 
that an organization was or was not “criminal” under the Charter. In the 
case of the Reich Cabinet, we have come to understand that it was not a 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 276. 
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body of collective governance of the German state after 1937. Members 
of the group continued to fulfill their individual functions but stopped 
performing their collective duties. Indeed, members occupied adminis-
trative roles under the direct command of Hitler. At some level, the IMT 
understood that in 1937, the power of governance, however character-
ized, was firmly in the hands of the leader and the Cabinet no longer 
carried out roles or functions that could attribute to it any form of col-
lective responsibility. 
A similar, but more nuanced, understanding of the Nazi state 
emerged when the Tribunal found that the General Staff and High 
Command could not be declared criminal organizations. Once more, 
this finding is grounded in both a legal conceptual position and a careful 
factual analysis of the evidence presented. Despite the prosecution’s 
claims of the centrality of the Military High Command and General 
Staff in both planning the war and supervising the international crimes 
committed, the Tribunal rejected this understanding of the military’s 
place in the Nazi state and in the commission of international crimes. 
For the IMT, the key legal point was that the meaning of a criminal 
“group” or “organization” had a particular significance “more than this 
collection of military officers.”54  As had been the case with the Reich 
Cabinet, the Tribunal sought a collective identity, beyond the agglomer-
ation of some or all of the individual members of an organization, in or-
der to find the criminal nature of the aims and acts of the organization 
as a legally identifiable body itself. Jackson later reported his chagrin 
concerning this analysis and decision, noting that “the failure to hold the 
General Staff to be a criminal organization is regrettable.”55 
The IMT unambiguously identified the “clear and convincing” ev-
idence of the criminal acts of many individual members in the upper 
echelons of the German armed forces.56 Nevertheless, the Tribunal re-
fused to recognize that there was sufficient evidence that the General 
Staff and High Command, as opposed to individual military leaders, as 
identifiable organizations, could have been involved in international 
criminality: 
To derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an as-
sociation or group does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, logically 
follow. On such a theory the top commanders of every other nation 
are just such an association rather than what they actually are, an ag-
 
 54. Judgment, supra note 24, at 278. 
 55. REP. OF ROBERT H. JACKSON TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN, INT’L CONF. ON MIL. TRIALS 
(1946). 
 56. Judgment, supra note 24, at 278.  
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gregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a 
given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.57 
IV. THE CONTEXT OF THE “CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS” CASE AND 
JUDGMENT 
It appears to emerge from this necessarily brief examination of the 
IMT’s criminal organization aspects that there was a conflict between 
the vision of the Nazi state proffered by the prosecutors and that embod-
ied and confirmed in the judgment of the Tribunal. On the one hand, 
Justice Jackson and his fellow prosecutors followed a path informed by 
the foundational ideals of a gangster state. For them, the Nazi Party and 
all those associated with the apparatus of the Nazi seizure of power, its 
consolidation of control over the state apparatus, and the unleashing of 
World War II and all of its atrocities, had from the very beginning, been 
engaged in an evolving common plan to commit acts against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the Tribunal 
adopted a somewhat subtler approach. It fixed the date of the conspiracy 
well after the Nazi seizure of power, and carefully analyzed the nature 
and role of the indicted organizations to determine their role with preci-
sion, if any, in the conspiracy and in the commission of substantive 
criminal offenses. 
The ideas that were presented about the Nazi state ranged from a 
crude assessment of the entire period from at least 1933 to 1945 as a 
large scale criminal conspiracy put into effect after the invasion of Po-
land, to one that considered the Nazi state as having evolved towards a 
planned aggressive war with different degrees of involvement (or none 
at all) from the various accused organizations. The Tribunal did not 
sugar coat the nature of German militarism, or the thuggish brutality of 
the SA. Instead, it limited itself to the facts as proven and as they related 
to the limited and narrowly defined criminal offenses over which it had 
jurisdiction. Even in the cases of the SS and the Gestapo/SD, it did not 
and could not find that the evidence supported the contention that they 
had been part of an overarching criminal conspiracy, or an intertwined 
series of criminal combinations, to wage war throughout Europe. With-
out ever really articulating a clear or coherent understanding of the con-
stitutional order of Hitler’s Germany, the IMT implicitly identified its 
functioning structures as something other than an international criminal 
conspiracy, and this was particularly evident in its treatment of the or-
ganization’s case. 
 
 57. Id.  
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If one digs a bit deeper into the jurisprudential structures and 
premises of the IMT and the broader judicial apparatus established by 
the Allied Occupying Powers in Germany, one can find evidence of the 
reasons behind the organization’s case and the care with which the IMT 
dealt with the law/fact nexus regarding the prosecution of major war 
criminals and understanding the nature of the Nazi state. 
We have already seen how the Tribunal received an enormous 
number of witness statements, affidavits, and documents in relation to 
the cases against indicted organizations. As part of its broader concerns 
with ensuring the delicate balance between and among the needs of ju-
dicial efficiency, adherence to basic principles of the rule of law, proce-
dural fairness, and the practical realities of a militarily devastated Ger-
many, the IMT developed mechanisms for concretizing those competing 
goals. It produced an Order “Regarding Notice to Members of Groups 
and Organizations” indicted before the Tribunal (“Order”).58 In addition 
to informing members of the organizations in question of the upcoming 
trial, the Tribunal also declared that members of identified criminal or-
ganizations could potentially face charges and punishment pursuant to 
their membership. In addition, members were entitled to apply for hear-
ings before the Tribunal “upon the question of the criminal character of 
the group or organization.”59 
Radio, postings, and newspaper advertisements published notices 
in German throughout occupied Germany with sufficient breadth and 
time “to give [the notices] the widest possible dissemination.”60 The 
Secretariat of the IMT served notices on the four occupying powers, 
which then disseminated the notices throughout Germany.61 Two hun-
dred thousand notices were prepared, nine thousand of which were giv-
en to the different sectorial authorities, and one thousand were retained 
for distribution among POW facilities. Fifty thousand were given to 
each Soviet Bureau of Information and British Public Relations branch-
es. Forty thousand were given to the French. The United States received 
the remainder. Newspapers and radio throughout Germany published 
the announcements. Each occupying authority submitted affidavits cer-
 
 58. See generally Order of the Tribunal Regarding Notice to Members of the Groups or Or-
ganizations, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 97–101 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
 59. Id. at 100. 
 60. Id. at 101. 
 61. See generally Certificates of Compliance with Orders of the Tribunal Regarding Notice 
to Members of Groups and Organizations and to Defendant Bormann, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 
NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 104–06 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
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tifying its compliance with the publication and distribution of these no-
tices.62 The organizations’ trial was considered significant and was con-
ducted to the best of the Tribunal’s ability. 
However, a further level of inquiry is necessary to determine why 
the organizations’ trial was given such significance and why the Tribu-
nal went to such extensive measures to give notice to members of the 
indicted groups. The answer lies not in the consequences of the declara-
tions of criminality against the organizations, but in the potential subse-
quent criminal liability of members of the organizations. Again, the 
IMT process needs placement in its juridical framework and in the 
broader political, social, and military contexts as well. 
The Tribunal’s Order clearly set out the notification requirement 
by stating individual members of organizations were subject to charges 
in subsequent proceedings of separate offenses pertaining to member-
ship affiliation in criminal organizations. Therefore, there was an inter-
est, both practical and legal; in ensuring that individuals potentially fac-
ing serious criminal charges because of membership affiliation be given 
adequate notice of that fact, or that penal law must be public and know-
able. Moreover, other understandings of fairness, the rule of law, and 
broad ideas of criminal justice also demand that individuals, belonging 
to organizations with stakes in the outcome of IMT proceedings, be giv-
en an opportunity to address the Tribunal and present exculpatory evi-
dence about the group to which they belonged. This exculpatory evi-
dence, if accepted, may allow such individuals to avoid personal 
culpability. Such rule of law concerns were always present in the mind 
of the Tribunal and prosecution teams. While the prosecutors clearly 
had a vision of the Nazi state structures and apparatuses, which would 
have imposed a broader liability than the Tribunal accepted, they were 
also fully conscious of the legal, moral, and practical difficulties of im-
posing severe criminal consequences against individuals based on their 
membership to organizations that the Tribunal classified as “criminal.” 
This was particularly true given the fact that after the verdicts of the 
IMT, it would not be open to re-litigate the core and condition precedent 
norm that the organization in question was criminal. 
The significance of the organizations’ part in the IMT proceedings 
transcended the declaration of group criminality because the nexus be-
tween this finding and subsequent trials of individuals for the crime of 
membership in a criminal organization. This was particularly true given 
the juridical framework in which the IMT operated beyond its own 
 
 62. See id.  
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Charter, its own rules of procedure, and evidence gathering. In fact, the 
failure of the IMT to focus specifically on the nature of the Nazi state, 
the “how’s and why’s” of the various organizations, and their place and 
role within that constitutional structure, may well be understood in 
terms of the significance of concerns over subsequent criminal proceed-
ings for membership crimes. This partially explains why the Tribunal in 
each of the declarations of criminality of the different organizations fo-
cused on the temporal elements already highlighted and, in many cases, 
offered an indication of the limited roles within some organizations, 
such as the Leadership of the Nazi Party, that it considered to being key 
parts of the organizational criminality. With regard to the SS, this may 
indicate why the IMT carefully examined the voluntary nature of partic-
ipation in the criminal activities of the organization in its declaration. 
Throughout proceedings, the IMT appears to have focused more on de-
limiting and explaining the criminal nature of organizations, with one 
eye on the issue of the directing or voluntary roles played by individual 
members. 
It is important to note that in addition to concerns about future 
consequences for individuals charged with membership crimes follow-
ing declarations of criminality, cause for concern might lie in the ab-
sence of a clearly articulated and detailed description of the operative 
structures of the Nazi state in the organization trial. In fact, none of the-
se organizations existed in law. This does not mean that the criminal or-
ganization aspect of the IMT proceedings is or was a mere hypothetical 
or theoretical undertaking. The issue of future trials on charges of mem-
bership in a criminal organization was concrete. Moreover, it is clear the 
prosecution (and perhaps to a lesser extent, the Tribunal) had an under-
standing of the Nazi state’s nature and wished to preserve it in concrete 
jurisprudence. Such a judgment of the criminal nature of the state appa-
ratus would clearly serve as some kind of foundational element in culti-
vating a vision of future world peace and an international community. 
In addition, there was clearly a pedagogical element to the IMT 
proceedings.63 The world was meant to compare and contrast democracy 
with the rule of law, with the constitutional order in Germany that inevi-
tably led to the mass killing of the Second World War and the Shoah. A 
declaration that core parts of the Nazi apparatus plotted against world 
peace and for the destruction of Europe (and European Jewry) would go 
a long way in the eyes of the prosecution in educating the international 
community on the dangers of the Nazi ruling. However, this declaration 
 
 63. See generally LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2005). 
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was exacerbated by the real and pervasive fear at the time that despite 
the annihilation of Nazi Germany’s military forces and supporters, the 
Nazi regime could perhaps mount some form of resurgence. Robert 
Jackson expressed the legal and political consequences of failing to 
prosecute the so-called “criminal organizations” in this context. 
In administering preventive justice with a view of forestalling repeti-
tion of these crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, it would be a greater catastrophe to acquit these organiza-
tions than it would be to acquit the entire twenty-two individual de-
fendants in the box. These defendants’ power for harm is spent. That 
of these organizations goes on. If they are exonerated, the German 
people will infer that they did no wrong and will easily be regiment-
ed in reconstituted organizations under new names, behind the same 
program.64 
Military defeat and physical devastation alone could not eliminate 
the twelve-year ideological and political legacy of the Third Reich. The 
declaration of organizational criminality could perhaps go some way 
towards eliminating that threat, and more concretely, it could serve as a 
basis on which many former Nazis could be prosecuted for membership 
crimes where evidence of substantive offenses might be more difficult 
to prove amid the disruptions of the immediate postwar and occupation 
periods. 
Despite the valiant and mostly successful attempts by the IMT to 
adhere to and implement principles of fairness, justice, and the rule of 
law, the work of the Tribunal nonetheless must be placed in concrete 
historical, political, and ideological, not to mention legal, frameworks in 
order for us to properly situate the organizations case in a proper con-
text. The prosecution and the Tribunal were each keenly aware of the 
overarching conditions in which they had to perform their judicial func-
tions. The Tribunal clearly knew that the singular importance of the 
declarations of organizational criminality could be found in its founda-
tional function for future prosecutions of individuals for membership 
crimes. Likewise, the prosecutors were careful to draw a clear legal line 
between organizational criminality and the personal liability of future 
defendants, while at the same time they continued to promote their par-
ticular vision of the way that the Nazi state apparatus operated, which 
was implicated in the indictment of international crimes. 
The first part of the context in which the Tribunal and its officials 
operated was the absolute military defeat of Nazi Germany. As the Al-
 
 64. Robert H. Jackson, The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations Are Accused of Being 
Criminal, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 371, 388–89 (1945). 
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lied forces reported on June 5, 1945: 
  The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been 
completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Ger-
many, which bears responsibility for the war is no longer capable of 
resisting the will of the victorious Powers. 
  There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable 
of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the admin-
istration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the 
victorious Powers.65 
The idea that Germany had been utterly defeated and its entire 
governmental infrastructure had been destroyed gave the Allied Occu-
pying Authorities a legal carte blanche to impose an entire system of 
occupation government, abolishing Nazi laws, banishing all forms of 
extant Nazi organizational infrastructure, and removing officials who 
might remain in place—all without having to feel bound by the interna-
tional legal limits imposed on armed military occupiers by the Hague 
Convention.66 Whether this Kelsenian view of the sui generis nature of 
the Allied Occupation is in fact correct, it appears to have been the in-
forming notion under which the governance structures and judicial ap-
paratuses of the Occupation, including the IMT to a large extent, oper-
ated. 
The instructions issued to Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Military 
Commander not only make this clear, but their specifics indicate that 
the ideas of dismantling the Nazi state apparatus and ridding Germany 
of Nazi influence, including the organizations indicted before the IMT, 
were among the highest priorities.67 From the earliest period of the 
“postwar,” the criminality and dangerousness of the organizations that 
were later tried before the IMT were informing ideas behind the Allied 
pursuit of demolishing and removing the threat of the resurgence of the 
Nazi state. 
Section 6(a), under the title “Denazification,” instructed Eisen-
hower and the Occupying Authorities to issue a “Proclamation dissolv-
ing the Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations, and supervised 
 
 65. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authori-
ty with Respect to Germany, Fr.-U.K.-U.S.-U.S.S.R., Jun. 5, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 
 66. See generally Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration 
of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT’L LAW 518 (1945); Charles Fahy, Legal Problems of German Occupa-
tion, MICH. L. REV. 11, 13 (1948); Max Rheinstein, The Legal Status of Occupied Germany, 
MICH. L. REV. 23, 27 (1948). 
 67. See U.S. DEP’T ST. BULL., U.S. DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER REGARDING THE 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY (April 1945) [hereinafter U.S. Directive], 
http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf. 
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organizations, and all Nazi public institutions which were set up as in-
struments of Party domination, and prohibiting their revival in any 
form.”68 
Eisenhower was further instructed to abolish all laws establishing 
the powers and functions of the Party and its organs,69 to remove Nazis 
from all leading social and political functions and positions,70 to ensure 
the dissolution and disarmament of all military and para-military units, 
including personnel,71 and to pursue and arrest war criminals.72 Eisen-
hower issued Proclamation Number 1 beginning this process, and a 
number of other more targeted Proclamations followed. Control Council 
Directive No. 18 abolished all German armed forces.73 All of this was 
consistent with the declared aims of the four Occupying Powers. 
The Potsdam Agreement identified the goals of the postwar Occu-
pation by Allied forces.74 Among the key objectives was the complete 
and final abolition of all German military forces, the SS, SA, SD, Ge-
stapo, as well as the General Staff.75 Additionally, the Agreement was 
aimed at the destruction of “the National Socialist party and its affiliated 
and supervised organizations.”76 Section IX of the Agreement abolished 
and declared illegal the National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
(NSDAP), and targeted “all Nazi public institutions created as instru-
ments of Nazi domination, and of such other organizations as may be 
regarded as a threat to the security of the Allied forces or to internation-
al peace and for prohibiting their revival in any form.”77 The practical 
and legal effect of these Allied decisions, directives, and proclamations 
was that by the time the IMT proceedings began, the accused group 
criminality organizations no longer existed. The real effect of the IMT 
declarations of criminality was always intended to be both pedagogic 
and historical on the one hand, offering a formal legal statement about 
each group’s nature and functioning in the matrix of the Nazi state, and 
 
 68. Id. § 6(a). 
 69. Id. § 6(b). 
 70. Id. § 6(c). 
 71. Id. § 7(a). 
 72. Id. § 8(a). 
 73. Control Council Directive No. 18, For Disbandment and Dissolution of German Armed 
Forces ¶ 1 (Nov. 12, 1945). 
 74. See THE BERLIN (POTSDAM) CONFERENCE, JULY 17–AUGUST 2, 1945, reprinted in S. 
COM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC 
DOCUMENTS, 1941–1949 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1950), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp. 
 75. Id. § II(A)(3)(i)(a). 
 76. Id. § II(A)(3)(iii). 
 77. Defeat of Germany: Additional Requirements (September 20, 1945), § XI, ¶ 39. 
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prospective on the other. In this second set of effects, the declaration of 
criminality could not be subsequently contested for so-called member-
ship crimes. A defendant would only be able to refer to his or her own 
criminal activities to the organization to which he or she belonged. The 
IMT expressed concerns over this part of their remit in the following 
terms: 
In effect, therefore, a member of an organization which the Tribunal 
has declared to be criminal may be subsequently convicted of the 
crime of membership and be punished for that crime by death. This 
is not to assume that international or military courts which will try 
these individuals will not exercise appropriate standards of justice. 
This is a far reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless 
properly safeguarded, may produce great injustice.78 
In fact, the IMT did limit the dangers to a certain extent by refus-
ing to enter a declaration of criminality against some organizations and 
placing clear temporal restrictions on the declarations relating to those 
organizations found to be criminal. It set the group criminality date on 
September 1, 1939—the invasion of Poland. Therefore, the criminal or-
ganizations’ trial was clearly part of the overall aims and goals of Allied 
Occupation policy. It also took place in a context in which all of the ac-
cused groups had ceased to exist. The limits of the IMT’s declarations 
were grounded in the pedagogical realm of offering a clear statement 
about the organization’s roles in the implementation of Nazi interna-
tional legal norms violations, and were situated in the context of the on-
going denazification processes in the occupied zones.79 Finally, the legal 
framework also involved interplay between the IMT and its trials of 
“Major War Criminals,” operating under Control Council Law No. 10. 
These included the indicted organizations and the other Occupation tri-
bunals, such as the later Nuremberg Tribunals.80 
Control Council Law No. 10 established the legal framework for 
implementing the Moscow Declaration related to war criminals not cov-
ered by the IMT proceedings against major war criminals.81 As already 
seen, the two judicial apparatuses (1) the IMT, and (2) all other courts 
 
 78. Judgment, supra note 24, at 257. 
 79. See generally Karl Lowenstein, Comment, Denazification, 14 SOC. RES. 365 (1947); 
Artur Sträter, Denazification, 260 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43 (1948). 
 80. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]. 
 81. See Joint Four-Nation Declaration, THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1943, re-
printed in S. COM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1941–
1949 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1950). 
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trying war criminals, were intimately linked in the question of organiza-
tional criminality. The declarations emerging from the IMT not only 
identified those groups that were liable for Nazi war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and crimes against peace, but also acted as irrebutta-
ble presumptions in all other proceedings. Finally, the wording of Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 contained one major and crucial amendment to 
the defining offences that could be brought before courts for adjudica-
tion. In addition to the crimes against peace and war crimes, Control 
Council Law No. 10 also included Crimes Against Humanity, with an 
important change in the definition of the offence. 
Article II paragraph 1(c) defined crimes against humanity as 
“[a]trocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecu-
tions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation 
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.”82 
The vital change here was that crimes against humanity were now 
legally constructed as a separate and distinct category of international 
criminal offences. This broadened the limiting factor from the IMT 
Charter such that crimes against humanity had to be connected with the 
commission of one of the other substantive offences, like war crimes or 
crimes against peace, or with the inchoate offences of a common plan or 
conspiracy. It also meant that other courts could now consider crimes 
against humanity separately as contrary to international law. More spe-
cifically, because the crimes no longer need to be connected with the 
more “traditional” international crimes, criminal offenses “against any 
civilian population,” regardless of “whether or not in violation of the 
domestic laws of the country where perpetrated,” would now theoreti-
cally encompass Nazi offenses against their own nationals, including 
the persecution and killing of German Jews.83 
Further consideration of the revolutionary potential of the changes 
to the world legal order brought by Control Council Law No. 10 is be-
yond the scope of my study here. However, another provision of Con-
trol Council Law No. 10, Article II, paragraph (1)(d), is central to the 
examination and understanding of the criminal organizations’ trials be-
fore the IMT. This provision added another new international criminal 
offence, which targeted “[m]embership in categories of a criminal group 
or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribu-
 
 82. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 80, at art. II, ¶ 1(c). 
 83. Id. 
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nal.”84 Article II, paragraph (3), provided for a series of possible penal-
ties including death, imprisonment for life or a lesser period with or 
without hard labor, a fine and imprisonment with or without hard labor, 
property forfeiture, an order of restitution and the deprivation of some 
or all civil rights.85 
While it is not my goal to explore the ways in which membership 
crimes evolved after the IMT, it is simply important to note that the dec-
larations of criminality against certain organizations did have a subse-
quent and significant impact on the prosecution of alleged Nazi crimi-
nals.86 Beyond the pedagogical aims of setting out in clear terms the 
roles played by these organizational structures in the carrying out of 
Nazi international crimes, the declarations concerning criminal organi-
zations in the subsequent trials provided oblique information about the 
understandings of the Nazi state abroad at the time. When taken in the 
context of the abolition of these groups in the earliest days of the Allied 
Occupation, the understandings by legal, military and political officials 
of the centrality of these groups for the structure and functioning of the 
Nazi state and the creation of the new international crime of member-
ship in a criminal organization or group and the analyses of the prosecu-
tion and the final decision of the Tribunal offer competing and complex 
constitutional portrayals of the Nazi state. The broad and general idea of 
a criminal state proposed by the prosecution was reduced by the tem-
poral nature and other limitations imposed by the IMT itself; in some 
cases, these declarations were refused. It seems clear that this more lim-
ited and narrower construction of the idea of a foundational criminality 
of the Nazi state found in the IMT judgment was the result of several 
interacting factors. 
First, the IMT was aware of the issues raised by the interactions 
between its final declarations of criminality and the newly created of-
fense of membership in a criminal organization under Control Council 
Law No. 10. Second, it is also clear that the IMT findings were limited 
by the wording of the substantive offenses, both in relation to the proof 
of the actual common planning for aggressive war, and in reference to 
the subsidiary character of crimes against humanity and the requirement 
of a nexus with one of the other offenses in the Charter. As a result, the 
IMT limited its declarations of organizational criminality to a limited 
period in 1937 and 1938, and then more concretely and generally to the 
 
 84. Id. at art. II, ¶ 1(d). 
 85. Id. at art. II, ¶ 3. 
 86. See generally FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN 
GERMANY, 1946–1955 (1989). 
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post-September 1, 1939 period. To a large extent, the criminal organiza-
tion judgments and their utility for understanding the nature and func-
tion of the organizational structures of the Nazi state are only limited, if 
they are of any use at all, in relation to the study of the Nazi state after 
the War began. The periods of the Nazi rise to power, the consolidation 
of Hitler’s rule, and the persecution of Germans, especially of Jewish 
Germans, that had been featured to a greater or lesser extent in the in-
dictments and in the presentation of the prosecution case, were defined 
out of contemplation by the factual and legal positions adopted by the 
Tribunal. 
However, the Tribunal’s organizational declarations did have a di-
rect impact on the subsequent creation of at least a skeletal constitution-
al law framework for understanding Nazi Germany. The interactions be-
tween these declarations of organizational criminality and the 
membership crime in Control Council Law No. 10 did play a role in al-
lowing subsequent cases to consider the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Nazi state. This was then confirmed by the language changes in rela-
tion to crimes against humanity and the focus on substantive offenses in 
Control Council Law No. 10. With its emphasis on accessorial liability, 
and its new membership crimes, this statute allowed prosecutors in a 
broader scope not just to pursue Nazi officials for crimes committed in 
Germany and against Germans, Jews and others, but also to paint a pic-
ture of Nazi criminality from the earliest days of the regime. Treating 
racial persecution of German Jews and others and the ideas of impris-
onment and enslavement that could cover the concentration camp sys-
tem before 1939 as criminal offenses under Control Council Law No. 
10 meant that subsequent prosecutors and judges could, and arguably 
did, paint a juridical-ideological picture of the Nazi state as a criminal 
state from its very inception. Because courts could now consider the na-
ture and function of Nazi organizations and individual perpetrators in a 
different geographical frame (Germany itself), in relation to a different 
time period (1933–1945), and in relation to different groups of victims, 
(German opponents, religious believers, German Jews, victims of the 
euthanasia and racial hygiene sterilizations measures, etc.), the com-
bined effects of these cases have arguably been the reinforcement of the 
original position adopted by Jackson before the IMT of the Nazi state as 
a criminal enterprise. 
On this view, even the IMT efforts to draw back on the prosecu-
tion’s overarching criminal state theory for rule of law, fairness and jus-
tice concerns, particularly in relation to the organization’s part of the 
proceedings, were defeated under Control Council Law No. 10 proceed-
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ings. Before briefly considering the consequences of this development, 
however, one final aspect of the IMT judgment on the organization’s is-
sue needs to be highlighted. The Tribunal was not unanimous in deliver-
ing its verdicts on the declarations of group criminality. In fact, the So-
viet judge dissented and accepted much more of the prosecution’s case 
against the named collective bodies. 
V.  THE SOVIET DISSENT 
While the USSR representative on the IMT, Major General Ni-
kitchenko, dissented both in terms of the accused’s guilt or innocence, 
and on the question of the sentencing of Rudolf Hess, whom he wished 
to execute, the significant point is that the disagreement lodged over the 
Tribunal’s refusal to declare the criminality of the Reich Cabinet, the 
General Staff, and the High Command. 
In relation to the Reich Cabinet, the Soviet judge underlined the 
basic fact of a massive Nazi criminality already found in the various 
judgments of the Tribunal related to “the Hitlerites,” who committed 
“innumerable and monstrous crimes,” that were almost entirely “com-
mitted intentionally and on an organized scale, according to previously 
prepared plans and directives.”87 Broadly speaking, the judge character-
ized the majority’s findings in terms that echoed the prosecution’s 
adopted position. Indeed, the judge sought to base his findings on the 
concept of the broad common planning at the heart of the Nazi state. In 
relation to the Cabinet, he declared that a logical conclusion from the 
other findings of Nazi criminality by the Tribunal appeared to be inevi-
table: 
  In view of this it appears particularly untenable and rationally in-
correct to refuse to declare the Reich Cabinet the directing organ of 
the State with a direct and active role in the working out the criminal 
enterprises, a criminal organization. The members of this directing 
staff had great power, each headed an appropriate Government agen-
cy, each participated in preparing and realizing the Nazi program.88 
These words offer a glimpse into the emerging Soviet understand-
ing of the Nazi state. For them, Hitler’s role did not diminish the culpa-
bility of those who surrounded him and those who directed the various 
agencies that implemented the Nazi program within the relevant areas 
of governance. It was “the Hitlerites” who planned and carried out the 
 
 87. Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Member of the International Military Tribunal, I TRIAL 
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 356 (Nuremberg, 1947). 
 88. Id. 
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Nazi program’s ongoing international criminality. According to the So-
viet point of view, to allow the Reich Cabinet to escape a criminality 
declaration was to fundamentally misapprehend the nature and function 
of this organization within the Nazi apparatus. Indeed, the absence of 
regular Cabinet meetings, and the personal power of Hitler within the 
state structure, merely confirmed the broader understanding of the Nazi 
state and the role of the Reich Cabinet within it.  To the Soviets, “These 
peculiarities do not refute but on the contrary further confirm the con-
clusion that the Hitler Government is not an ordinary rank and file cabi-
net but a criminal organization.”89 
On this point, the USSR’s position on the nature of the Nazi state 
directly echoes the argument made by the prosecution authorities 
throughout the IMT proceedings. The particularity of the Nazi state 
from its very inception was that it was a vast criminal enterprise aimed 
at the violation of the international legal order. A similar point about the 
state constitutional structure informed the Soviet dissent on the General 
Staff and the High Command. For the USSR: 
  This organic inter-relationship between the Nazi Party and the SS 
on the one hand and the Nazi Armed Forces on the other hand, was 
particularly evident among the upper circles of military hierarchy 
which the Indictment groups together under the concept of criminal 
organization—that is, among the members of the General Staff and 
the OKW.90 
These high-ranking military officials were key conspirators in 
planning the Nazi war of aggression and in issuing the orders that led to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.91 Most importantly, they acted 
at all times as members of the small group that surrounded Hitler and 
were intimately involved as an organization in planning and implement-
ing crimes against international law.92 
It should come as no surprise that the Soviet judge would seek 
harsher punishments against the convicted or would see the culpability 
of all the accused and indicted organizations. Alone among the prose-
cuting powers, the USSR had suffered the full force of Nazi aggression, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Britain had been bombed, and 
France had been occupied and had suffered under the Nazi yoke, but the 
war in the east was of a different level and measure of brutality and vi-
ciousness. This alone could explain and justify the attitude and position 
 
 89. Id. at 358. 
 90. Id. at 359. 
 91. See id. at 359–64. 
 92. See id. at 364. 
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of the Soviet judge. 
However, this ignores a fuller and more comprehensive contextu-
alization of the USSR’s dissent to the criminal organization question. 
For example, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the framework behind Soviet 
jurisprudence, ultimately saw law as a useful ideological and repressive 
tool to use against the enemies of the people. This approach perceived 
no clearer enemy of the people than the leaders of the Hitlerite aggres-
sion that destroyed much of the Soviet Union. However, it is necessary 
not to overemphasize the notion that some political ideology is the mo-
tivating force that distinguishes and explains the dissenting judgment. 
Clearly all the conquering powers represented in Occupied Germany 
and at the IMT perceived the Nazi state and its leaders as their enemies 
and as a threat to their political systems. All the Occupying Powers saw 
suppressing Nazi criminality through legal proceedings as a necessary 
method to defeat the Nazi state and its constituent parts; no other expla-
nation adequately contextualizes the process from the Moscow Declara-
tion to the IMT proceedings, to Control Council Law No. 10. Different 
understandings of the rule of law, or the role that the law that might 
have played, do not remove politics and ideology from the hermeneutic 
framework for understanding the jurisprudence of the IMT in general, 
or the operating constitutional assumptions about the Nazi state. This 
does not mean we must forego or forget Soviet ideology in an attempt to 
place the dissent in its context, but instead that we should be careful and 
aware of other contextual elements in our analysis. 
On the negative side, we must never forget the atrocities associated 
with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol of 
the Von Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement that divided Poland between 
the two States.93 Nevertheless, this needs to be understood not in terms 
of the perfidy of the agreement, or its horrendous consequences for the 
people and nation of Poland, but rather in terms of obtaining a fuller 
understanding of the complex factual and legal history of the Soviet Un-
ion’s perception of the Nazi state. The secret protocol and the agreement 
reveal firstly the ideological analyses Marxism-Leninism might have 
provided to understand Nazism as a state and constitutional form of 
government. Realpolitik allowed Stalin to reach a deal with a nation that 
had suppressed and perverted the working class. Secondly, the agree-
ment and protocol note the significance of periodization in the historical 
and legal analyses of the Nazi state. The USSR did not begin to portray 
 
 93. See generally Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, Secret Additional Protocol, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., Aug. 23, 1939 [hereinafter “Treaty 
of Non-Aggression”]. 
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the Nazi state as criminal enterprise until Hitler broke the non-
Aggression Pact by launching Operation Barbarossa. Instead, the USSR 
employed the techniques and legal framework of international relations 
and international law when dealing with Germany. It maintained diplo-
matic relations with Germany throughout 1933 and beyond. The arrival 
of Nazi control over Germany changed nothing between the Soviet Un-
ion and Germany. The Soviet Union entered into diplomatically negoti-
ated and legally binding treaties with Germany. Only after hostilities 
began did the characterization of Hitlerite aggression and criminality 
surface in Soviet politics and legal discourse. 
While all of this must be noted when attempting to understand the 
text and impacts of the Soviet dissent at Nuremberg, other factors also 
arise. Once hostilities did take place, the USSR played a key role in the 
international military action against the Germans. Soviet actions against 
the Nazis clearly had an important, impact that lead to the ultimate de-
feat of Germany in 1945. On the legal front, the first real joint Allied 
statement outlining the understanding of Nazi international criminality 
and expressing the firm intention of the Allied countries to pursue Nazi 
criminals is included in the Moscow Declaration. The first trials against 
Soviet collaborators and against Nazi war criminals took place in the 
Soviet Union at Kharkov and Krasnodar.94 As one sympathetic jurist put 
it, a key lesson from the trial at Kharkov was: 
The responsibility of the heads of the Axis States—of Hitler, his 
gang and all other arch-criminals—for all the crimes which they 
have tolerated and ordered [are] personal and criminal. It is not 
merely political or moral. They must be tried and punished according 
to the criminal laws of their victims.95 
Most importantly, the Soviets were consistent in their expressions 
of understandings about the nature of Nazi criminality and about the or-
ganizational structures and responsibilities behind this criminal behav-
ior. From the start of Germany’s Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets 
mounted a concerted effort aimed at documenting and denouncing Nazi 
crimes committed on their soil. For example, Foreign Minister Molotov 
sent a note to all countries with which the USSR had diplomatic rela-
tions. In that note he explained: 
There have been many recent instances of atrocities which have tak-
en on a specially glaring character, thus once again exposing the 
German Military Authorities and the German Government as a gang 
 
 94. Michael J. Bazyler & Kellyanne Rose Gold, The Judicialization of International Atrocity 
Crimes: The Kharkov Trial of 1943, SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 77, 80 (2012). 
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of cut-throats who ignore all principles of international law and hu-
man morality.96 
Two months later in January 1942, Molotov again issued an inter-
national complaint in the following terms: 
Irrefutable facts prove that the regime of plunder and bloody terror 
against the non-combatant population of occupied towns and villages 
constitutes not merely the excesses of individual German officers, but a 
definite system previously planned and encouraged by the German 
Government and the German High Command, which deliberately foster 
the most brutal instincts among soldiers and officers in their army.97 
At the end of 1942, the Soviets denounced the extermination of 
Jews as “a bestial plan for the physical extermination of a considerable 
part of the civilian population of German-occupation territories,” at-
tributable to the “criminal Hitlerite rulers.”98 That report concluded with 
a warning about the retribution awaiting a Soviet and Allied victory: 
Heavy will be the punishing hand of the nations, which will cast off 
the yoke of the German-Fascist invaders. Neither the ruling Hitlerite 
clique nor the base executors of its criminal, bloody orders shall es-
cape the vengeance of the liberated nations.99 
These are a few examples of the way the USSR in its public pro-
nouncements, often accompanied with evidence from captured German 
documents, or statements from the interrogations of German POWS, 
consistently characterized the German state as a criminal state, run by a 
ruling clique of gangsters. These examples also show how the USSR 
continued to portray the entire government structure of the Nazi state 
and the higher echelons of the military as core elements at the heart of 
the vast criminal enterprise. 
At the present time the Soviet Government has in its possession doc-
uments recently seized in the headquarters of routed German army 
units, from which it is clear that the bloodthirsty crimes and atroci-
 
 96. Note from V.M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., to all 
Governments with which the U.S.S.R. has diplomatic relations (Nov. 25, 1942), in SOVIET 
GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS ON NAZI ATROCITIES 7 (1946) (on the subject of “Appalling atroci-
ties committed by the German authorities against Soviet Prisoners of war’).  
 97. Note from V. Molotov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., to to all 
Governments with which the U.S.S.R. has diplomatic relations, in WE SHALL NOT FORGIVE!: 
THE HORRORS OF THE GERMAN INVASION IN DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS 3 (1942) (on the 
subject of “The Monstrous Crimes, Atrocities and Acts of Violence perpetrated by the German 
Fascist Invaders in the Occupied Soviet Areas and the Responsibility of the German Government 
and Military Command for These Crimes”).  
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 99. Id. 
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ties of the German fascist army are being perpetrated in accordance 
with carefully drawn up and thoroughly worked out plans of the 
German Government and at the orders of the German Military 
Command.100 
Leading Soviet legal officials fleshed out the understandings and 
juristic principles underpinning the consistent position of the USSR in 
its pronouncements of the Nazi criminal state. They rejected the idea of 
collective responsibility, at least in criminal law in terms of the German 
people. A. N. Training, the leading example of Soviet legal thinking on 
the subject, wrote, 
It is necessary really and concretely to determine which groups, 
which persons must be recognized as having inspired, organized, fa-
cilitated and executed the Hitlerite atrocities. The question of respon-
sibility of the accomplices of Hitlerite misdeeds thus acquires a very 
great importance.101 
Trainin not only articulated an understanding that groups must car-
ry a criminal burden with the deeds of the Hitler regime, the idea at the 
core of the organizations case, but he relied specifically on an under-
standing of the law in relation to complicity, a theory that is similar to 
the idea of a common plan or conspiracy later deployed by Jackson et 
al. at Nuremberg. More specifically, the Soviet jurist examined the more 
central role of “the Hitlerite superiors—the commanding authorities of 
Germany.”102 A study of the structures of government and governance in 
Germany led to the conclusion that: 
  With the German Fascist Government group is inextricably bound 
up another political grouping- the great and little “Fuehrers” of the 
Fascist party. . . . The controllers of the Hitlerite ministries were at 
the same time leaders of the party. Persons in charge of the local au-
thorities were at the same time leaders of the local party organiza-
tions. 
  With this same criminal governmental and party leadership must 
be classed likewise the German High Command, which organized 
the bandit activities of the Fascist armies and directed those activi-
ties.103 
The Soviet Union had a consistent, somewhat belated, understand-
 
 100. WE SHALL NOT FORGIVE!: THE HORRORS OF THE GERMAN INVASION IN DOCUMENTS 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS, supra note 97, at 1. 
 101. A. N. TRAĬNIN, HITLERITE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 79 (Andrew Roth-
stein trans., Andrey Yanauryevich ed., 1945). 
 102. Id. at 81. 
 103. Id. at 82.  
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ing of the nature of the German state and of the place of leading struc-
tures and organizations within that state. Its view was of collective 
criminality at the highest levels, and of a state informed more by gang-
sterism than anything. They saw the government leaders within the 
Reich Cabinet and the Military High Command and General Staff as be-
ing intimately part of the broad criminality of the Hitler regime and 
more directly as the directing force behind the atrocities commissions 
and international law violations on Soviet territory. They developed a 
sophisticated legal complicity theory and the special nature of interna-
tional criminality to carry forward thus understanding to the war crimi-
nal’s prosecution, both domestically and in the IMT international forum. 
General Nikitchenko’s dissent was more than a mere frolic of his 
own, or one informed by a crude Leninist legal instrumentalism. In fact, 
and in law, the Soviet position, both in relation to the broad understand-
ing of the Nazi state and as far as the issue organizational liability was 
concerned, was remarkably similar to that adopted in the case developed 
by Justice Jackson. The dissenting position related to the Reich Cabinet 
“acquittal” and to the failure to find that the High Command and Gen-
eral Staff constituted criminal organizations. Throughout the war, the 
consistent Soviet position had been that the highest-ranking German 
military officers were key actors in the vast array of international crimes 
perpetrated on Soviet soil and that leading political figures, such as 
members of the Reich Cabinet, fulfilled those roles because of their 
high-ranking party members’ status. As such their role in Hitlerite crim-
inality was almost a foregone conclusion. That the Soviet judge should 
hold firm to this position, when it had also formed part of the prosecu-
tion’s main case, is in the end evidence only that different conceptions 
of the constitutional structures of the Nazi state, and foundational ques-
tions about the core nature of the Hitler regime, remained unresolved. 
Historians and lawyers have begun to examine the complex pro-
cesses leading up to the IMT’s creation and operation.104 Still others 
have offered studies of the Soviet role in the lead up to the Nuremberg 
Trials.105 It is not my place to further these projects, but it is the function 
of this article to urge a more in depth study of the “criminal organiza-
tion (or organizational)” aspects of the IMT proceedings, both in the 
formulation of the innovative ideas of group criminality and “member-
ship crimes” at Nuremberg in relation to Control Council Law No. 10 
proceedings. One potential way of looking at these questions comes 
 
 104. See generally KOCHAVI, supra note 14.  
 105. See generally GEORGE GINSBURGS, MOSCOW’S ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE SOVIET 
BACKGROUND TO THE TRIAL (Kluwer Law International 1996). 
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from a comparison of the Nazi criminal state’s constitutional conception 
advanced by Justice Jackson, with the Soviet legal position’s detailed 
history on this question. 
None of this is meant to suggest the Soviet Union possessed an 
unblemished record in pursuit of Nazi criminality or in the international 
legal development order that emerged after the IMT; but instead, to 
suggest that historical and legal scholars need to begin to take the 
USSR’s contribution to and role at the Nuremberg Trial both more seri-
ously and as a consequence more contextually. As Francine Hirsch in 
her important study of the Soviets and the IMT has put it: 
  Ultimately, acknowledging the Soviet contribution to Nuremberg 
means looking with open eyes at the complex political forces that 
shaped the IMT and the postwar order. Nuremberg was as much 
about politics as it was about justice- and it could not have been oth-
erwise. The USSR and the Western powers all had somewhat differ-
ent ideas about the meaning of “justice” and how it should be served. 
  While all the countries of the prosecution saw Nuremberg as a po-
litical contest, it was a contest at which the United States particularly 
excelled. The fact that the Anglo-American narrative of the IMT 
continues to prevail testifies to the success of the U.S. and its West-
ern Allies in making Nuremberg their own.106 
Broadly speaking, I would add an important caveat to this analysis 
of the ideology and jurisprudence of Nuremberg. In relation to the 
“criminal organization” aspects of the IMT proceedings, it might be 
worth noting that there was not a single or singular vision of the consti-
tutional system of the Nazi state or of the place and role of the different 
allegedly criminal “groups” therein among the U.S. and its Western Al-
lies. What the criminal organizations cases as a whole demonstrate is 
that there was an overall vision of the Nazi state as a criminal combine 
from its very origins, in which the indicted organizations played a vital 
role. This vision was advanced by the prosecution led by Justice Jack-
son and echoed in Soviet political and legal discourse both at the trial 
and before. On the other hand, a more limited vision was set out by the 
majority judgment, limiting Nazi organized criminality to the later peri-
od of Hitler’s rule—post-1937—and situating real organized criminali-
ty, in particular in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
to concrete offenses committed after September 1, 1939. This again was 
in part the result of the Tribunal’s reading of the evidence, its concep-
tion of the common plan or conspiracy limited in temporal scale, and 
 
 106. Francine Hirsch, The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the 
Making of the Postwar Order, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 701, 729–30 (2008). 
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the limited effects of the definition of the international crimes it had to 
consider. There is one understanding of the Nazi state from its origins at 
the heart of the Jackson/Soviet position, and another of the Nazi state at 
war, when it truly did become a criminal state. 
A jurisprudential and/or a socio-legal analysis of the IMT and of 
the criminal organizations’ aspect of the proceedings in particular there-
fore demands perhaps more details and more nuances than even Hirsch 
has applied. One final set of ideas will add still much needed historico-
legal and intellectual, or at least jurisprudential, context to serve as a po-
tential framework for future work on the subject. 
VI.  PREQUELS AND SEQUELS: THE LEGAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE 
IMT CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS TRIALS 
It is not necessarily surprising that no overarching theory of the 
Nazi state and its constitutional apparatus emerged from the jurispru-
dence of the IMT. Indeed, given the history and nature of constitutional 
law debates between Nazi jurists themselves during the period of con-
solidation of power, it is little wonder that “outsiders” after the fact 
could come to grasp in a coherent way the complexities, both political 
and legal, of the evolving Nazi state.107 
If one can trace the Soviet ideological and jurisprudential construc-
tions of the Nazi state and its constituent and constitutive elements, he 
will find that a particular set of temporalities inform changing attitudes 
and analyses, and the same can be said of Western, especially Ameri-
can, understandings of the Hitler regime. I am not making a claim that 
such understandings were univocal or unanimous. Instead, I simply con-
tend that the same historical periodization that is necessary to under-
stand and fully comprehend the jurisprudence of the USSR and the Hit-
lerite regime must also be applied to American portrayals of the Nazi 
regime, its legal system, and its overall structural apparatus. 
I have already examined in some detail the ways in which the Brit-
ish and American legal systems, and legal scholars within those coun-
tries, dealt with and characterized Nazi law.108 Such studies reveal quite 
 
 107. Peter Caldwell, National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto Ko-
ellreutter, and the Debate Over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933–1937, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
399 (1994). 
 108. See generally DAVID FRASER, ‘The Outsider Does Not See Al the Game. . .’: Percep-
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OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND 
ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 87 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003); David Fra-
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Courts, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2003). 
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clearly that the ideas of a Nazi state as a “criminal state” run by gang-
sters, or a legal system characterized from its beginnings as one of  “as-
sassins in judicial robes,”109 was not the informing framework in which 
American lawyers, judges, and law professors, understood the Nazi sys-
tem of law, and the overarching state and administrative apparatus that 
created and applied those laws. For the legal professions in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the system of Nazi laws, including 
those laws particularly targeting Jews and Jewish property, did not rise 
to the same level of moral opprobrium as that which characterized the 
prosecution at the IMT or in subsequent proceedings. However, the Na-
zi state and its legal system were understood; they were never placed in 
the category of a “criminal state” operating a system of  “law in name 
only,” until after the beginning of the Second World War. At this level 
of the ideological and jurisprudential construction of the Nazi state and 
its legal apparatus, the American (and British) attitudes and formula-
tions share a remarkable similarity in their evolution along the path to 
the “criminal state” with the USSR’s own evolving taxonomies. 
Like the Soviet Union, the United States also treated the Hitler re-
gime from 1933 until it declared war in 1940 as a legitimate actor in 
world affairs. Unlike its relations with the USSR, the United States al-
ways recognized Germany as a state actor in the international realm.110 
Whatever the intricacies, contradictions and factual and legal complica-
tions that might inform the international framework of state recognition, 
there was never a serious attempt by the United States to treat Nazi 
Germany as a “criminal state,” in the sense of a mere group of gangsters 
pretending to be legitimate.111 Until the outbreak of armed hostilities be-
tween the United States and Hitler’s Germany, the American govern-
ment treated the German Reich as an equal international entity. Ameri-
can and British firms (in)famously continued to do business in the Third 
Reich without issue.112 As those found to be mentally unfit were com-
pulsorily sterilized, as political and religious opponents or “enemies” of 
the Nazi state were imprisoned in increasingly harsh conditions of con-
 
 109. See generally Evil Law, Evil Lawyers?, supra note 13. 
 110. See generally Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Considera-
tions, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605 (1941). 
 111. See generally SIR HERSCHE LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONL LAW 
(1947) (This is wrapped up in the even more difficult issue of exactly what a state is and how it 
might be considered to be constituted in its originary moments); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Mo-
ment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209 (2010). 
 112. See generally Neil Forbes, Multinational Enterprise, ‘Corporate Responsibility’ and the 
Nazi Dictatorship: The Case of Unilever and Germany in the 1930s, 16 CONTEMPORARY 
EUROPEAN HISTORY 149 (2007); Gabriel Kolko, American Business and Germany, 1930–1941, 
15 POL. RES. Q. 713 (1962). 
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finement as the Nazis tightened their grip on the apparatus of the state 
and the economy, and as German Jews were excluded, humiliated, ex-
propriated, sent to concentration camps, expelled and killed, the Ger-
man state that accomplished and carried out these acts, many of which 
would be classified as crimes against humanity under Control Council 
Law No. 10, continued to be a nation state with full and complete legit-
imacy under the operating norms of international relations. 
This is important not only for the direct story it tells about the na-
ture and state of international law in the 1930’s, or about the apparently 
radical re-writing of these rules in the immediate postwar, but also for 
the more oblique narrative it helps to construct about the understandings 
of the Nazi state. I am not suggesting, of course, that the only regimes 
that can be, or are to this day, recognized as legitimate actors under in-
ternational law and the rules of international legal recognition, are dem-
ocratic, rule of law regimes. Instead, I am making the smaller and more 
focused point that whatever the rules of valid international legitimacy 
might have been, there was never an understanding that the Nazi regime 
was anything other than legitimate and lawful. There was no idea 
abroad, as there had been in the case of the USSR after 1917, that the 
Nazi revolution had caused such a change to the structures and norma-
tivity of the German Reich that Germany no longer existed as an inter-
national actor. Indeed, it seems clear that whatever changes the Nazis 
brought to the German state, those changes were not considered by the 
international community to have been “revolutionary” in the same sense 
as the Bolshevik conquest of power. Whatever goals the Nazis had in 
mind and whatever fundamental changes were brought by the consoli-
dation of the Nazi state and of Nazi law and mechanisms of govern-
ance—including the idea of the Führerprinzip, the symbiosis between 
the Nazi Party and the state that resulted from the changes operated by 
the Nationalist Socialist “revolution,” for the international community, 
and including the United States—were not fundamentally radical 
enough to constitute an equivalence with the Russian Revolution, or to 
constitute a radical break in the continuity and legitimacy of the German 
state. 
This does not mean that the United States was unaware of the 
changes operated by the Nazi consolidation of power. However, it does 
indicate that the “criminal state,” organized gangster-ism, and the ille-
gitimacy thesis that informed the prosecution’s case at Nuremberg was 
as ideological, political, contingent, and historically and temporally de-
rived as the USSR’s characterization of the Nazi state. For example, in 
one case, the phrase “the Hitlerite Government, the super-hangman 
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Himmler and their S.S. and S.D. henchmen” was used.113 In fact, a brief 
survey of contemporaneous academic, political, sociological, and legal 
literature throughout the period of Nazi consolidation and rule, offers 
clear evidence that America and Americans fully understood the nature 
of the Nazi state apparatus, of the structures of governance, and of the 
ways in which power operated within those structures.114 
Writing as early as 1934, Frederick Schuman produced a careful 
analysis of the Nazi regime.115 He did not hesitate to characterize it at 
this early stage as a “dictatorship.” He offered a careful examination of 
the ideologies and positions adopted by the Nazi Party, but more signif-
icantly, for the construction of the Nazi state and the concepts reflected 
in and elaborated at Nuremberg. He carefully placed the Nazi Party and 
its hierarchy at the center of the German state apparatus.116 He also iden-
tified the political and juridical violence that had characterized the elim-
ination of political rivals, and offered a clear understanding of the dicta-
torship as building its power through a clear focus on the dangers a 
perfidious Jewish influence posed to the German people.117 Finally, he 
carefully analyzed and portrayed the role played by leading industrial-
ists and the landed Prussian gentry in supporting the rise to power of 
Hitler and the NSDAP, and the role they played in consolidating the 
dictatorship through a new economic power structure.118 Finally, in a 
remarkable instance of prescience, or perhaps more simply of careful 
political and sociological thought, Schuman wrote that “Fascism is 
driven toward war by its own ideology and by the tightening ropes of 
economic strangulation in which its ruling classes are entangled.”119 
Two years later, Fritz Marx authored a detailed analysis of the Na-
zi state’s apparatus.120 Like Schuman, Marx portrayed and understood 
the Hitler regime in terms of the gradual mainmise over the mechanisms 
 
 113. Judgment, supra note 24, at 225. 
 114. In what follows, I focus by way of example only on four leading books written on the 
topic during the relevant time frame. The periodical literature, particularly by political scientists, 
reflects the same conceptions and concerns, but a careful or detailed study of that literature is for 
another day. See, e.g., Arnold J. Zurcher, The Hitler Referenda, 29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 91 (1935); 
Albert Lepawsky, The Nazis Reform the Reich, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324 (1936); John A. Hess, 
Volk und Führer, 11 GERMAN Q. 4 (1938); Taylor Cole, Current Appraisals of German National 
Socialism, 1 J. POL. 195, 195–205 (1939). 
 115. See generally FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, HITLER AND THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP: A 
STUDY IN SOCIAL PATHOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF FASCISM (2d ed. 1936). 
 116. See id. at 49–94.  
 117. See id. at 312–39. 
 118. See id. at 387–422. 
 119. Id. at 504. 
 120. See generally FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX, GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD REICH 52, 90 
(1936). 
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of government by the Nazi Party under the broad understanding of the 
unity of Party and a state within a system operating under the singular 
Führerprinzip. As Marx notes: 
The blueprint of authority on which modern Germany emergency 
government is modeled displays two distinct features: the concentra-
tion of all power in the hands of the Leader in whose person the 
means of governmental and of extragovernmental adjustment, state 
and Party, are combined; and the deliberate elimination of all those 
statutory confines which qualify the exercise of power.121 
Marx saw Germany under Hitler as a fascist dictatorship with a 
one-party system.122 He placed special importance on the invocation of 
emergency decrees as the basis for consolidating state power as a Füh-
rerstaat.123  Even at this stage in which the civil society, economic pow-
er, and the Party all operated in an apparently synergistic relationship 
under the unifying leader, he did not claim there to be a state without a 
normative constitutional basis. This was still not a “criminal state.” 
One finds many similar elements offered in the leading and key 
analyses by Karl Lowenstein in 1939.124 Lowenstein similarly offers a 
careful recitation of the Nazi rise to power and of the consolidation of 
the state apparatus around Hitler and the Party.125 He adds the important 
element of the centralization of governance through the “elimination” of 
the states (Laender) and the creation of a unitary state apparatus.126 
Moreover, Lowenstein examines the maintenance of a system of police 
and justice, albeit under Nazi influence and control.127 In other words, at 
the constitutional level, Lowenstein still identified the operative mecha-
nisms of a state apparatus as late as 1939. While that apparatus had been 
completely Nazified, it nonetheless continued to function not as a gross 
and simple criminal conspiracy, but as a recognizable state system, 
working within the ideological and political structures of National So-
cialism. The state and civil society were becoming, or already were, 
consolidated, but this did not mean that there was no state in any mean-
ingful sense.128 In addition to the amalgamation of the state and civil so-
ciety, Lowenstein also identified, as had Schuman, another key element 
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 123. See id. at 60–64. 
 124. See generally KARL LOEWENSTEIN, HITLER’S GERMANY: THE NAZI BACKGROUND TO 
WAR (1939). 
 125. See id. at 1–26. 
 126. See id. at 54–69. 
 127. See id. at 86–98. 
 128. See id. at 127–34. 
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of National Socialism, or perhaps of fascism more broadly (i.e. the cen-
trality of a coordinated economic structure in which the private goals of 
industrial capitalists were made one with the aims of the state).129 Final-
ly, as a precursor to the organizational criminality aspect of the Nurem-
berg Trials, and its relation to understanding the constitutive elements of 
the Nazi state, Lowenstein offers this: 
An equally important change in the constitutional set-up of the Third 
Reich is the establishment of a permanent Council of Ministers for 
the Defense of the State . . . For the time of the present political ten-
sion abroad and “for the uniform management of the administration 
and economic affairs” a Ministerial Council is formed, under the 
chairmanship of Goering, and comprising as permanent members . . . 
men holding key positions in the inner government circle.130 
For Lowenstein, even after the invasion of Poland and the begin-
ning of World War II, but before the entry of the United States, Germa-
ny still had a constitutional system and an “inner government circle.” 
Again, there is no sign at this date, the date at which the IMT had sig-
naled the imposition of collective, organizational criminal responsibility 
in relation to the groups and individuals charged with membership 
crimes, of a theory of the Nazi state as a vast criminal conspiracy run by 
gangsters. Lowenstein’s vision would of course evolve and he would go 
on to become one of the leading figures in the Allied Occupation and 
the “restoration” of the rule of law in Germany.131 
Finally, William Ebenstein produced a monumental study of the 
Hitler regime in 1942, in the middle of the war, and after the beginning 
of hostilities with the United States.132 Yet he insisted that what he was 
studying was indeed a state, one recognized as the only legally recog-
nized entity against which a declaration of war was possible in interna-
tional law. He offered detailed analyses of the apparatuses of the Nazi 
regime, from national government,133 state and local government,134 the 
Nazi Party,135 Law and Justice, 136 religion,137 and the economy.138 
Ebenstein was quick to identify the oppressive nature of the Nazi re-
 
 129. See id. at 143–46. 
 130. KARL LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 124, at 174. 
 131. See generally R. W. Kostal, The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Lowenstein and the Legal 
Reconstruction of Nazi Germany, 1945–1946, 29 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2011).  
 132. See generally WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, THE NAZI STATE (1943). 
 133. See id. at 23–44. 
 134. See id. at 45–55. 
 135. See id. at 56–68. 
 136. See id. at 69–107. 
 137. See id. at 199–226. 
 138. See WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, supra note 132, at 227–70. 
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gime and the roles played by the various organizational structures in the 
implementation of the aims of the Hitler state. He also comes closest to 
considering the Nazi state to be illegitimate or illegal in the ways in 
which, only four years later, the entire United States process of prosecu-
tion and occupation, more broadly conceived, would define and charac-
terize the Nazi state. For Ebenstein, and to a lesser extent for Marx, the 
Nazi state was best understood as the embodiment of a state and a gov-
ernance structure operating, almost from the beginning, under a system 
of martial law, but illegally imposed.139 The Nazi state came into being 
as a revolutionary state both in fact and law. 
Examining the original appointment of Hitler by Chancellor von 
Hindenberg, Ebenstein concludes that, “It was as legal as the appoint-
ment of Al Capone or John Dillinger as the headmaster of an industrial 
school for delinquent boys would be legal.”140 
The references to Capone and Dillinger echo or pre-echo the asser-
tion that the Nazi state was run by gangsters. At the same time, the 
analogy does not fundamentally go to the core constitutional legality of 
the Nazi state. Appointing Capone or Dillinger to run a school for de-
linquents might well be naming the fox to run the henhouse, but if the 
person nominating the fox has the power to do so, the appointment is 
“legal.” Ebenstein puts some emphasis on the idea that von Hindenberg 
may have acted illegally in naming Hitler since the Nazis had long ex-
pressed their hostility to the existing constitutional order, and von Hin-
denberg had sworn an oath of allegiance to that same constitutional or-
der.141 
However, Ebenstein’s constitutional law analysis of the Hitler state 
really flows from his assertion that the Nazis operated a fundamental 
and revolutionary change to the nature of the German state when they 
came to power. We have seen that this was not the understanding of the 
world of international relations or international law in 1933 or thereaf-
ter, and therefore one must again put Ebenstein’s analysis in its tem-
poral context. Perhaps one finds here the same type of taxonomical 
change in constitutional analysis as can be detected in the rapid switch 
in Soviet legal and ideological positioning of the Hitler state after the 
German invasion of the USSR. 
Ebenstein, nonetheless, does offer an intriguing reading of the 
formal, positive legality of the Nazi state that to some extent at least 
goes beyond the “criminal state” hypothesis. He places the Emergency 
 
 139. See id. at 1–22. 
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Decree of February 28, 1933, under which the Nazis suspended many of 
the freedoms of the Weimar Constitution, at the heart of his case: 
The decree is still law. No new constitution has been made since the 
destruction of the Weimar charter. The executive act destroying the 
Weimar Constitution is therefore the basic constitutional document 
of the Nazi regime because it deals with the fundamental rights of 
the citizen and the basic powers of the government. Let us remember 
again that this basic act established a state of martial law in Germa-
ny. Since it has never been lifted since the, it must be presumed that 
in law, as well as in fact, martial law is still in force and will remain 
so until it is revoked. Until a new constitution is passed, the constitu-
tional pattern established by the presidential emergency decree of 
February 28, 1933, is the fundamental German constitutional docu-
ment. Martial law has thus been the Nazi constitutional system since 
1933.142 
It is impossible to review the ways in which Ebenstein’s analysis 
might be considered to be flawed or incomplete. He fails to recognize 
that under the Weimar Constitution itself, the same powers to suspend 
liberties were invoked numerous times by legitimate democratic gov-
ernments. He also does not consider that on his own analysis, only some 
of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution were suspended while the 
rest, in theory, remained in effect. He does not contemplate the fact that 
many of the other provisions of the Weimar Constitution were rendered 
moot by other “legal” changes operated and instituted under the Nazi 
consolidation of power. This also means that his understanding of the 
“constitution” of the Nazi state is literally and restrictively “textual.” A 
deeper understanding of “constitutionalism” and indeed of “constitu-
tionality,” particularly in the British unwritten constitution tradition, but 
not limited thereto, could perhaps lead to an understanding of the Nazi 
Constitution, or constitution, that would go beyond one textual provi-
sion, and to a position that constitutional, or at the very least, constitu-
tive, change does not require, by definition and ineffably, a new formal 
text labeled “constitution.” 
But even if we ignore the intriguing political, jurisprudential, and 
ideological issues left open by Ebenstein’s assertions, if we take him at 
his word and accept his position, it remains the case that there was al-
ways a Nazi constitution. “Martial law” is still law, and historical legal 
experience clearly indicates that a regime of martial law does not render 
a state illegitimate, unlawful, or criminal. Many intriguing and im-
portant questions for legal philosophy and constitutional theory arise in 
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the context invoked by Ebenstein around issues of what becomes of the 
state when the “state of exception” under martial law becomes the norm 
and the normative jurisprudential reality.143 But what does seem clear 
here is first, that martial law is still law, and second, Ebenstein seems to 
be laying the groundwork for the subsequent outright assertions of the 
“criminal state” theory, despite the gravitational pull in jurisprudential 
terms of the first point. What is important once again is that however 
logically, legally, or philosophically sound this analysis appears to be to 
us now, it did at the time manifest a clear move away from previous un-
derstandings of the Nazi state as a totalitarian, but legitimate, state to-
wards the “criminal state” thesis of the Nuremberg prosecutors. 
VII. CAPITALISM AS ORGANIZED CRIME AT NUREMBERG 
One element of the reorganization of the German state and society 
under the Nazi regime that is featured in each of these studies of the 
Hitler state is the focus on the role the wealthy capitalist class played in 
financing Hitler’s rise to power. The ways in which quasi-monopolistic 
capitalism functioned as a core element of the Nazi policy of rearma-
ment, and then of the war economy, also played essential roles in under-
standing the way in which the Nazi state functioned. The problematic 
charges against the bed-ridden Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Holbach 
as a representative of the Nazi version of the military industrial complex 
at the heart of Reich governance structures, is but one example of the 
ideas held by the prosecuting authorities of the IMT that cartel capital-
ism and its participants played a central part in the international crimes 
of the Nazi state. The subsequent prosecution of the Flick concerns and 
I.G. Farben before the NMT further highlights the fact that Allied legal 
officials understood the Hitler regime in terms that found a clear nexus 
between the ways in which monopolistic capitalist formations and the 
apparatus of the Nazi state existed at the heart of the regime. 
Kim Christian Priemel has argued that an understanding of the or-
ganization of capitalist enterprise in Nazi Germany was not just a core 
element of the way in which the country functioned, but that such an 
understanding also informed much of the prosecution strategy before 
the IMT, and in some important subsequent trials at the NMT.144 The fo-
cus on individual evildoers and concepts of barbarity that have come to 
dominate the post-Nuremberg understandings of the trials and their leg-
 
 143. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 
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 144. See generally Kim C. Priemel, A Story of Betrayal: Conceptualizing Variants of Capital-
ism in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 85 J. MOD. HIST. 69, 71 (2013). 
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acy has, he argues, served to distort not only the functional reality of the 
Nazi state and the core place of monopoly capital therein, but it also ig-
nores the fact that the Nuremberg prosecutors and investigators under-
stood that reality very well. 
Such a focus also fails to account for the broader conceptualizations 
of Nazi criminality underlying the trials- the understanding of the 
structure of the dynamics of the Third Reich that proved to be crucial 
in determining the way in which the trials were designed, which 
charges were brought against which defendants, and the place of the 
proceedings in the overall debate on the feature of Germany. The 
economic dimension was not just one among many; it stood at the 
very center of the debate on National Socialism, how to deal with its 
crimes, and what to do with the vanquished nation.145 
Priemel’s argument is important for several interconnected rea-
sons. First, the idea of refocusing on the economic aspects of Nazi crim-
inality brings to the fore elements of the history of Nazi war crimes that 
have played a secondary role. Second, his position allows us to examine 
the complexities behind the legal thinking of the Nuremberg prosecutors 
in a way that demands that we consider all the factors that were present 
at the relevant time. There was in fact a complex legal theory, informed 
by historical and political analyses, of the nature and extent of Nazi 
criminality at work in the construction of the cases before the IMT, and 
later the NMT. Third, this permits a view of the IMT proceedings not 
just in the spectrum of trials that dealt with Nazi war crimes and crimes 
against humanity—for instance US and British military courts, the 
NMT, national courts in a number of recently liberated countries, Soviet 
war crimes trials, etc.—but also permits us to place the IMT proceed-
ings in the broader context of occupation policy and practice more gen-
erally. 
We have, for example, already seen that in the minds of the prose-
cutors, the criminal organizations aspects of the IMT proceedings fit not 
only within notions of retribution under law that formed a core jurispru-
dential basis for the cases, but also within the pedagogical scheme in-
volved in both creating a juridico-historical account and record of Nazi 
atrocities. Moreover, it highlighted the roles played by different organi-
zational structures in the perpetration of Nazi crimes. Beyond this, 
Germany was physically and economically wrecked at the end of the 
war. After significant debate around the Morgenthau plan, which pro-
posed the reconstruction of Germany in terms of creating only an agri-
 
 145. Id. at 71. 
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cultural state, the Allies, and the United States in particular, opted for 
re-building an industrial economy in the new Germany.146 This meant 
that there was always an economic understanding informing broader Al-
lied policies and that this understanding was in itself grounded in an his-
torical view of the intimate connection between the nature of German 
monopolistic capitalism and its involvement in the commission of Nazi 
crimes. Thus, it becomes necessary to any proper reconstruction of the 
history of the constitution of the Nazi state, as understood by Allied au-
thorities at Nuremberg and beyond, to situate the arguments about crim-
inal organizations (and of the IMT more generally) in this context and 
to examine, for example, the reasons behind the failure to pursue indus-
trial combines under the “criminal organizations” head. It is also neces-
sary to choose another mechanism to deal with what was nonetheless 
considered to be a core aspect of the Nazi state and social apparatus, and 
to pose an ongoing threat to the establishment of a Rechtsstaat and a 
peaceful liberal democracy in Germany. Thus the elimination of these 
criminal industrial combines took place not before the IMT and through 
a declaration of criminality from the Tribunal, but rather through a de-
veloped legal program of decartelization of the Germany economy.147 
Priemel’s analysis offers us an important reminder that the IMT 
and the prosecutors did not operate in an intellectual, historical or juris-
prudential vacuum. Instead, they operated with the understanding of the 
nature of industrial capitalism and its role within the Nazi state and Hit-
ler’s war economy. Powerful industrial combines concretized the remili-
tarization of Germany in preparation for the plans to wage aggressive 
war; they benefitted financially from the Aryanization of the economy; 
they profited from the war and the policies and practices of pillage in 
Occupied Europe; and they employed slave laborers through contracts 
with the RHSA and SS, some of whom were in the heart of the Nazi 
death machine.148 The prosecutors understood this, and they indicted 
 
 146. See generally WARREN F. KIMBALL, SWORD OR PLOUGHSHARES?: THE MORGENTHAU 
PLAN FOR DEFEATED NAZI GERMANY (1976). 
 147. See generally U.S. ARMY, REP. TO THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (Apr. 15, 1949) 
(Special Committee to Study Decartelization and Deconcentration in Germany) [hereinafter “The 
Ferguson Report”]; John G. Stedman, The German Decartelization Program: The Law in Repose, 
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 441 (1950); Henreich Kronstein & Gertrude Leighton, Cartel Control: A Rec-
ord of Failure, 55 YALE L.J. 297 (1945). 
 148. See generally United States v. Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (U.S. Gov’t Print-
ing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949); United States v. Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Office Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949); JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF 
I.G. FARBEN (1st ed. 1978); JOSIAH E. DUBOIS, GENERALS IN GREY SUITS: THE DIRECTORS OF 
08 FRASER .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/17  7:14 PM 
172 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 39:117 
Krupp as a representative of that industrial oligarchy. They pursued in-
dustrialists before the NMT, and as noted, other lawyers in the Occupa-
tion machinery broke up the cartels. The question that remains is why 
the cartels did not feature as “criminal organizations” at the IMT. 
The obvious explanation is that the decartelization mechanism was 
already well underway, but this is not sufficient since the organizations 
and groups included in the indictment had themselves already ceased to 
function or exist. Other factors, including the core issues of Nazi law 
and the nature of the Nazi state, also no doubt played a role. 
Doreen Lustig has recently attempted to place the conception of 
the Nazi state and Nazi legality at the heart of her reading of the so-
called “Industrialist Trials” before the NMT.149 There is much to be ap-
plauded in Lustig’s analysis, particularly her conviction that the core 
question of the nature of the Nazi state was a strong intellectual and ju-
risprudential presence in the cases seeking to prosecute the perpetrators 
of Nazi international crimes. Her understanding of the difficult relation-
ship between the liability of individuals for international crimes and the 
ideas of criminal organizational “liability” also echoes important 
themes. Finally, she is to be applauded, in part at least, for returning to 
the fundamental concern when she writes: 
The state as such was never on the dock at Nuremberg. The aspira-
tion of the Nuremberg architects was to hold men rather than abstract 
entities accountable for international law. Yet, the call to pierce the 
corporate veil of the state assumed such piercing could be done with 
no theory of the structures of authority at stake and led to a limited 
and incomplete allocation of responsibility.150 
The “criminal organizations” aspect of the IMT proceedings, Jack-
son’s statements about the centrality of that part of the case to the pros-
ecution’s understanding of the nature of Nazi criminality, and the goals 
of the pursuit of Nazi criminals, to some extent, belie the bold assertion 
found in Lustig’s characterization of “the Nuremberg architects.” The 
differing positions adopted by the prosecutors and the Tribunal or the 
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dissenting Soviet judge, point to the need to broadly analyze and con-
textualize the IMT and other parts of Occupation legal practice to high-
light that there may not have been a hegemonic theory at work even in 
the cases studied by Lustig. Nonetheless, it does remain true that the ul-
timate focus on individual liability, even in relation to the “membership 
crimes” flowing from the declarations of organizational criminality, 
does appear to have constructed the narrative of “evil” and “barbarity” 
attaching to specific actors and to the detriment of an allocation of re-
sponsibility based on the historical, and legal, reality of the Nazi state. 
It is here that Lustig’s contribution becomes important, not be-
cause it is ultimately “correct,” but because it brings to the fore of so-
cio-legal inquiry about Nazi criminality and the IMT the question of the 
place of cartel capitalism in understanding the functional realities of the 
Nazi state, and the importance of the role played by understandings of 
the legal normativity of the Hitler regime. Lustig does this by examin-
ing the role played by the competing theoretical, jurisprudential under-
standings of the Nazi state offered by Ernst Frankel151 and Franz Neu-
mann.152 
For Neumann the Nazi state was a totalitarian state characterized 
by the role of the party and Fuhrer,153 supported by a “totalitarian mo-
nopolistic economy.”154 The overall structure of the Hitler regime was 
informed by synergistic arrangements and relationships between and 
among the Party, the Ministries, the civil service and bureaucratic appa-
ratus, the armed forces, and the industrial and agrarian elites, many of 
the elements identified in earlier analyses of Nazi Germany offered by 
Marx, Schuman and Lowenstein for example. These arrangements, 
however convenient and put to practical effect, resulted in a form of 
government and governance that was irrational and unpredictable.155 For 
Neumann, this led to the conclusion that there was no operating or oper-
ative “law” in Nazi Germany since the core value of predictability for 
legal norms according to which citizens and economic actors could 
gauge their behavior was absent.156 
Behemoth is a work deserving of a more in depth study than I 
 
 151. See generally ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY 
OF DICTATORSHIP (E.A. Shils in collaboration with Edith Lowenstein & Klaus Knorr trans., 
1941). 
 152. See generally FRANZ L. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1942). 
 153. See id. at 41–61. 
 154. See id. at 255–92. 
 155. Id. at 378. 
 156. Id. at 382. 
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could hope to offer here. Indeed, as Raul Hilberg, who himself changed 
Holocaust historiography, put it, it is shocking that Neumann does not 
figure more prominently in literature about the Holocaust since many of 
his key ideas about National Socialism, the state and law under the Na-
zis, etc., find clear echoes not just in the IMT proceedings but in the 
work of many scholars, yet without a direct attribution to Neumann’s 
original insights.157 Neumann is to a certain extent the ghost who haunts 
our attempts to come to terms, however temporarily and tentatively, 
with the long shadow of the law over the Holocaust and our broader un-
derstandings of the jurisprudence of the Nazi state. As shall become 
clear in the discussion that follows, I do not share Hilberg’s assessment 
that Neumann’s analysis was correct in many of its key elements, but I 
do share the feeling that we have ignored his contribution to debates on 
these core issues for too long. 
Neumann’s views are complex and his evidence, like his approach, 
is both historical and sociological. I can only offer a cursory summary 
of the central thematic of Behemoth. At its core is the characterization 
of Nazi Germany as a country operating under a “totalitarian monopo-
listic economy.”158 In its overall approach Neumann’s analysis is thus 
fundamentally faithful to its Marxist origins, emphasizing as it does, the 
centrality of economic structure to the functioning of the state itself. But 
the analysis does remain somewhat removed from any crude economic 
determinism.159 Instead, Neumann begins with a careful overview of the 
“state” itself, arguing that, following a Schmittian view, the National 
Socialist regime had in fact replaced the traditional Bismarckian and 
Weimar structures of the state with a new way of imagining sovereign-
ty.160 Sovereignty, and therefore the “state” organization, no longer re-
sided in the “state” per se but in the racial Volk. Thus, the state appa-
ratus as traditionally understood, had been replaced by a combination of 
racialized people: the Party, as the embodiment of the people’s will; the 
Führer, as the spokesperson of that Will; and a series of structures, 
which functioned solely to put the needs of the people into practice. 
In this part of his inquiry, Neumann returns to the joint theme that 
 
 157. See generally Raul Hilberg, The Relevance of Behemoth Today, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 
256 (2003). 
 158. NEUMANN, supra note 152, at 255–92. 
 159. See generally MARTIN JAY, THE INSTITUTE’S ANALYSIS OF NAZISM, in THE 
DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF 
SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923–1950, at 143–72 (1996). 
 160. See generally CARL SCHMITT, DIE KIDTATUR (1921); CARL SCHMITT, DER FÜHRER 
SCHÜTZT DAS RECHT (1934). 
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he had already signaled in his previous work on law and rationality.161 
The removal of the “state” under National Socialism was accompanied 
by an ideological vision of the Volk, and an understanding of sovereign-
ty leading Neumann inexorably to a new set of organizational and nor-
mative imperatives. The bureaucracy no longer served a Weberian ra-
tional function within a broadly liberal understanding of the public or 
private divide between state and market, and state and civil society.162 
Under National Socialism, the distinctions of this Hegelian, Weberian 
conceptualization and sociological vision of the nation state disap-
peared. Instead, it was replaced by the total and unique goal of serving 
the interests of the Volk. Rationality, in the sociological sense, had been 
replaced by a different irrational “logic,” while, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, similar structures of governance continued to exist and function. 
Under this new system, “law,” as Neumann defined and deployed it, as 
the embodiment of traditional understandings of political and sociologi-
cal rationality, also ceased to function.    
The rejection of state supremacy is therefore more than an ideolog-
ical device intended to conceal the party’s betrayal of the army and the 
civil service; it expresses the real need of the system to do away with 
the rule of rational law. As Neumann points out: 
We must not be deceived into assuming, however, that centralization 
of bureaucratic machinery has in any way lessened in Germany, that 
the party’s existence had in any way restricted bureaucratic powers. 
On the contrary, preparedness and war have noticeably strengthened 
authoritarian control in the federal, state, and municipal bureaucra-
cies.163 
Just as Weberian rationality, and with it “rational law,” had been 
subsumed by some new form of sovereignty under National Socialism, 
along with its vision of a racial Volk, so too did the conception of other 
forms of legality undergo an important set of changes. As the nation 
state was replaced by the racial state, it was not just domestic visions of 
sovereignty that were radically modified. For Neumann, the National 
Socialist project carried forward the old German imperial vision by sub-
stituting the Volk for the state in its conception of international law.164 
The idea of a Greater Reich, of Lebensraum, of imperializing aggres-
 
 161. See generally WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (1996). 
 162. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(1958). 
 163. NEUMANN, supra note 152, at 80. 
 164. See id. at 184–220. 
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sion in the service of the people, became the driving force of this recon-
ceptualization of international law under the Nazis and the imperative 
ideological impetus behind the wars of aggression being waged by 
Germany against “Europe.” At this level, consistent with the historical 
materialist conception and analysis, the Nazi state project was the logi-
cal and inevitable consequence of trends, practices, and ideological no-
tions inherent in German history.  This then leads to a conclusion that a 
primary purpose and function of the Nazi state apparatus and all of the 
constituents of this agglomeration of power were from their origins tar-
geting aggressive war and the conquest of territory as a primary and 
original function and goal. The ideas of the Nazi state as a “criminal 
state,” constituting gangs formed within a common plan or conspiracy 
to violate international legal norms, are echoed (or originated from) 
here. 
Even more significantly, however, it is here that Neumann places 
the nature and function of Nazi law. For him, the Nazi re-imagination of 
the state and sovereignty led to a reconfiguration of public law and in-
ternational law under National Socialism. The “regulation” of the econ-
omy also led to a Nazified reconceptualization of property and contract 
law that removed a number of hurdles to the proper functioning of the 
cartelized economic structure. Other aspects of Nazi law then come to 
the fore in Neumann’s analysis as he studies the now familiar “phenom-
enon” of the terror state. Again, as a preliminary observation, this char-
acterization is hardly surprising given Neumann’s general position that 
even the legal changes operated by the Nazi regime to facilitate both the 
construction of a racialized Volkisch state and the operation of monopo-
ly capitalism ultimately fail his test of individualized rationality as the 
core aspect of any “legal” system properly so-called. At an important 
level, I believe, this serves to disqualify much of what Neumann has to 
say about Nazi law as potentially useful to any current or future re-
search project at a foundational level. Surprisingly perhaps, his legal 
philosophical position on Nazi law appears to operate from strongly a 
priori assertions about the proper and objective content of the “law.” 
Given his historically and sociologically more complex studies of the 
Nazi state, its economic structures, and indeed his examination of core 
concepts or property and contract in those studies, it seems quite out of 
place that his analysis of Nazi law in almost all its aspects should pro-
ceed from such presumptions that do not ultimately assist our under-
standings. 
As Lustig points out, it might in fact be more useful to turn to the 
work of Fraenkel to more accurately situate corporate monopolistic cap-
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italism and its organs in the context and setting of Nazi constitutional 
structures and within an understanding of the nature and role of Nazi 
law. In Fraenkel’s view, it was possible to understand the Nazi regime 
as embodying a so-called “dual state.”165 The traditional constitutional 
apparatus, including the judicial function and the ordering of private and 
business arrangements, could be understood as existing under the appel-
lation of “the administrative state,” an apparatus that continued to oper-
ate, more or less, under the Nazi regime. On the other hand, significant 
functions of the state were carried out under the auspices of the “discre-
tionary state,” including orders from party officials, the police and forc-
es of order, the SS and SD/Gestapo. That part of the state apparatus ex-
isted and functioned, but did so largely along lines similar to those 
identified by Neumann, as directory missive and the exercise of person-
al, ideological and political discretion. For Fraenkel, the Nazi regime 
existed in a state of flux and of co-existence between the two parts of 
the “dual state” with the prerogative state eventually and ultimately, in 
the case of conflict, emerging victorious. But the key aspect of 
Fraenkel’s analysis is that he left much more room for the existence of 
an operative and operating legal system within large parts of the Ger-
man state, including in relation to monopoly capitalist enterprises. 
It does not really matter at this point whether one accepts or is 
more convinced by these visions of the Nazi state and the presence, or 
absence, of the “law” within Hitler’s Germany. What is more interesting 
in considering the “criminal organizations” aspect of the IMT proceed-
ings and the broader legal, political, and ideological contexts thereof, is 
that, whether directly or obliquely, one can find, reflected in the differ-
ent judicial and legal positions adopted by different actors at Nurem-
berg, variations on the jurisprudential themes identified by Neumann 
and Fraenkel. These themes relate directly to the issues of law and gov-
ernment exposed in detail in the conflicting understandings of “collec-
tive” criminality articulated before the IMT. 
However, as Priemel has pointed out, it is necessary to proceed 
with caution and with a full set of contextualized understandings on the-
se questions. More is, and was, at stake before the IMT (or NMT)—for 
example, the conduct of the legal officials in charge of the decarteliza-
tion program—than a simple and unquestioning acceptance of Neu-
mann’s idealization of the Nazi state as the Behemoth of monopolistic 
capitalism.  Indeed, the conduct of the legal officials in charge of the 
decartelization program was also at stake: 
 
 165. See generally FRAENKEL, supra note 151. 
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[T]he different groups and individuals involved frequently differed 
strongly in their assessments of National Socialism, their interpreta-
tions of German history, and their recommendations for Allied occu-
pation policies. But there were also a great many points where de-
bates touched upon one another, where different branches of 
learning—history, political science, sociology, jurisprudence—found 
that they dealt with the same issues and actually built on each other’s 
findings. Nuremberg became the historical site where these discours-
es coalesced, making for a case of partial and temporary, yet effec-
tive, epistemic convergence.166 
Of course, this epistemic convergence was not always efficacious, 
and discourses sometimes did not coalesce. The position of the prosecu-
tors, the Tribunal, and the dissenting Soviet judge in the “criminal or-
ganizations” aspect of the IMT proceedings clearly evidence ongoing 
and persistent disagreements and different understandings of the nature 
of the Nazi state, the common plan and conspiracy in which the organi-
zations may or may not have participated, and in the temporal frame for 
Nazi criminality in all its aspects. But what is important is that all of 
these actors applied, explicitly or by clear inference, a clear understand-
ing of the nature and function of the Nazi state and its constituent or-
gans, including the place (or absence) of law within these structures. 
Moreover, the law itself played a crucial role in the manifestation of 
these understandings. The more narrow and temporally limited under-
standing of the common plan or conspiracy proffered by the IMT deci-
sion was in large part at least a function not just of law in the sense of 
the evidence and proof presented to the Tribunal, but of the narrow and 
contingent dependent status of crimes against humanity. As the wording 
of the relevant legal tests changed under Control Council Law No. 10, 
the provisions of which controlled the NMT proceedings, those cases 
brought to the fore in more substantive ways understandings of the 
“criminality” of the Nazi state between 1933 and 1939 (as well as after), 
and of the nature of that state apparatus and its criminal acts against 
German citizens and nationals during that period. The constructions of 
the Nazi state and of Nazi law and their relationship with organized and 
organizational criminality shifted and changed throughout the Occupa-
tion and beyond, from the IMT to the NMT. These contingencies and 
elements of context perhaps render the tasks associated with examining 
broad questions about the Nazi state and corporate criminality more 
complex than we might have imagined, but they also make such inquir-
ies more relevant than ever. 
 
 166. Priemel, supra note 144, at 73–74. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
One of the ironies of attempting to situate the ideas of collective 
responsibility or the criminality of an organization at the heart of the 
IMT processes is that a fundamental goal of the Nuremberg trials was, 
in fact, to place the individual as the responsible actor in relation to in-
ternational crimes. The idea that the “state” was the only legitimate 
“person” in international law was invoked in an attempt to shelter the 
defendants from personal liability. As Judge Francis Biddle explained, 
the IMT took a large step forward by fixing personal responsibility at 
the center of its processes: 
There is moral value in fixing responsibility in a field of anonymous 
irresponsibility. A State, after all, like a corporation, is a fictitious 
body. . . . But authors of acts criminal under international law cannot 
shelter themselves behind their official positions. If the State moves 
outside of its competence under international law the authority to act 
cannot create immunity.167 
Lustig complains that an opportunity was lost during the subse-
quent trials before the NMT because those trials sought to focus on in-
dividual criminal liability. This focus meant that the Tribunals did not 
give voice to an understanding of the place of corporate capitalism and 
the cartels that operated under the Nazi regime and were central to its 
aggression.  According to Lustig: 
Although Nuremberg is celebrated for putting individuals in the 
dock, holding them accountable for international crimes, it ended up 
equating the notion of the individual with political leadership. The 
individual responsibility as such was not seriously addressed. In the 
context of crimes against peace, it led the tribunals to allocate re-
sponsibility only to those they identified as part of the leadership cir-
cle; the political leadership, so to speak. With regard to atrocities 
committed in the camps, responsibility was allocated only to those 
with direct, physical link to the crimes.168 
While it is true that “the State” was never in the dock before the 
IMT or the NMT, and one can make a strong argument that the criminal 
trials missed an opportunity to consider the overall constitution of the 
Hitler regime and its constituent parts in terms of organizational liabil-
ity, it is also the case that the “criminal organizations” part of the IMT 
proceedings did result in quite specific declarations concerning the 
criminal nature of many of the most important elements of the Nazi re-
 
 167. Francis Biddle, The Nurnberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REV. 679, 688 (1947). 
 168. Lustig, supra note 149, at 1043–44. 
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gime. These declarations did then expand the attribution of liability un-
der Control Council Law No. 10 proceedings for membership crimes. 
Lustig appears too easily to have forgotten this aspect of the NMT pro-
ceedings and to approach the NMT trials as if there was no other sur-
rounding context in which they took place. The decartelization process, 
for all its failures, did seek to attack the idea of a strong form of corpo-
rate liability for the evils of the Nazi regime. There was more to the Oc-
cupation policy and legal practice than the IMT, and the NMT cases and 
any analysis of the idea of organizational or collective legal criminal re-
sponsibility must always seek to take the broader and wider contexts in-
to account. 
In addition, two further technical jurisprudential points need to be 
taken into account in any assessment of the Nuremberg trials. As Biddle 
himself points out in his account of the importance of the IMT in estab-
lishing the personal responsibility of individuals for international 
crimes, the individual responsibility of officials is triggered when “the 
State moves outside of its competence.”169 It seems clear, as I have ar-
gued, that the IMT did in fact take a view on broader issues of the con-
stitutional law and validity of the Nazi state in reaching its determina-
tions on individual and on organizational criminal liability. “Crimes of 
aggression” in particular are committed by states against states. “War 
crimes” are committed, or were committed at the time of the IMT, dur-
ing the processes of a “war” between two states. Thus, constitutional 
and international law theories of the nature and proper function of the 
“state” were at the heart of the IMT’s jurisprudence, albeit in ways that 
remained largely un-articulated or under-articulated. 
Secondly, it is important to remember that the jurisdiction of the 
Military and other courts operating under Control Council Law No. 10 
was specifically limited to the pursuit of membership crimes in relation 
to organizations subject to a declaration of criminality by the IMT. They 
had no power to declare other organizations to be criminal. They acted 
against individuals because their jurisdiction was limited to taking ac-
tion against individuals. However, the definition of criminality under 
which the NMT operated did contain a small element of “collective” re-
sponsibility since Article II (2) stated that anyone was “deemed to have 
committed a crime” against peace if they “held high position in the fi-
nancial, industrial, or economic life.”170 Thus, while the prosecution 
necessarily targeted individuals, the substantive provisions defining the 
scope of individual criminality under international law as defined in 
 
 169. Biddle, supra note 167, at 688. 
 170. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 80, at art. II § 2. 
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Control Council Law No. 10. implicitly, if not expressly, embodied un-
derstandings of the nature of organized criminality by industrialists and 
others in relation to the Nazi state’s pursuit of a policy of illegal aggres-
sion. 
Lustig’s conclusion also appears to have forgotten that the entire 
apparatus of the legal administration of Occupied Germany, and at-
tempts by lawyers to establish criminal liability and dismantle state and 
“private” apparatuses that were at the core of Hitlerite criminality, need 
to be taken into account in a much more contextualized way in order to 
examine and test Priemel’s arguments about a much broader narrative 
of Nazi criminality informing a variety of Occupation policies.171 More-
over, it is obvious even from the words of key officials of Allied policy 
such as Robert Jackson, that in dealing with the issue of “criminal or-
ganizations” aspects of the IMT trial, more was at stake than punish-
ment or criminal labeling.172 The destruction of the organizational appa-
ratuses of the Nazi state, and the prevention of them from taking hold 
again, formed not just part of the “legal” aspect of the criminal organi-
zations’ trial in the IMT proceedings, but the declarations of criminality 
against key groupings meant to inform the German people of the nature 
of those organizations and the dangers posed by their operating ideolo-
gies. 
More broadly, the entire Occupation process was meant to demon-
strate not only the basic criminality of the individuals put on trial before 
the IMT and NMT, or the broader guilt of organizations declared to be 
criminal by the IMT, but also to create a narrative of culpability or guilt 
among the German populace at levels beyond the limitations of penal 
liability. Most famously, German philosopher Karl Jaspers set out a 
taxonomy of guilt arising out of the actions of the Nazi state and the de-
feat of Germany. For Jaspers, Germans had to consider criminal guilt, 
political guilt, moral guilt, and metaphysical guilt.173 Beyond the obvi-
ous criminal guilt, political guilt is attributed to citizens who consented 
to, and participated in, a state-based system that violated basic norma-
tives of natural and international law.174 Moral guilt falls on individuals 
for the moral and ethical consequences of all of their own actions. 175 
Metaphysical guilt is attributable to all as members of humanity in 
 
 171. See generally Priemel, supra note 144.  
 172. Jackson, supra note 64, at 385–86. 
 173. See generally KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 25–40 (E.B. Ashton 
trans., Fordham Univ. Press, 2001). 
 174. Id. at 25. 
 175. Id. at 25–26. 
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which a wrong against one is a wrong against all.176 In relation to Nu-
remberg: 
This differentiation of four concepts of guilt clarifies the meaning of 
the charges. Political guilt, for example, does mean the liability of all 
citizens for the consequences of deeds done by their state, but not the 
criminal or moral guilt of every single citizen for crimes committed 
in the name of the state.177 
Even today, there are serious questions as to whether Jaspers’ tax-
onomical structures of guilt were able to transcend the apparently over-
arching sentiments among Germans that the IMT instantiated a combi-
nation of victors’ justice and collective guilt.178 However, what this 
taxonomy does allow us to consider is the broader set of narratives 
about “guilt” and the wider and sometimes extra-criminal mandate and 
political and ideological goals of the Allied Occupation regime in Ger-
many. There were sometimes competing understandings of the nature of 
the constituent elements of the Nazi regime and ideas of collective or 
organizational responsibility that informed a number of Occupation pol-
icies and practices. The powers vested in the IMT to issue declarations 
of criminality against certain groups played an important part in those 
broader policies both juridically, in terms of subsequent membership in 
crime proceedings, and ideologically, as part of the broader ideological 
and political goals of destroying the Nazi infrastructure and its ideologi-
cal underpinnings in postwar Germany. 
None of this means, however, that the IMT process in relation to 
“criminal organizations” is beyond criticism. Biddle himself confessed 
that the Tribunal was troubled by the apparent innovative character and 
juridical novelty of the idea of “criminal organizations” and especially 
concerned by the connection between declarations of criminality and 
individual guilt under the membership crimes provisions of Control 
Council Law No 10.  “Conviction of a corporation does not taint its 
stockholders with its guilt.”179 The Tribunal therefore went out of its 
way to limit, as we have seen, the temporal frame for organizational 
criminality, and sought to limit their potentially dangerous application 
in subsequent proceedings: 
The organizations were defined in terms to include in their member-
ship only persons who voluntarily became or remained members 
 
 176. Id. at 26. 
 177. Id. at 26–27. 
 178. See generally BERNHARD SCHLINK, GUILT ABOUT THE PAST (House of Anansi Press, 
Inc. 2009). 
 179. Biddle, supra note 167, at 692.  
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with knowledge that the organizations were being used for the com-
mission of acts declared criminal by the Charter. In net result there-
fore it will be necessary to establish individual guilt in subsequent 
proceedings. The declarations are thus deprived of all but psycholog-
ical significance, and there is no shadow of precedent to encourage 
the practice of mass prosecution.180 
Biddle’s concern about the possibility of “mass prosecution” is 
perhaps well-placed in the context of the IMT’s ongoing concern for its 
own legitimacy and that it be seen to project the values of judicial pru-
dence and attention to rule of law ideals. As Telford Taylor highlighted 
in his report about the work of the NMT, “The outstanding fact about 
the war crimes ‘problem’ at the end of the Second World War is that, 
like many other postwar problems, it was far bigger and far more diffi-
cult of solution than anyone had anticipated.”181 
In such circumstances, “mass prosecution” may well have ap-
peared as a desirable and efficient way of dealing with the mass nature 
of Nazi criminality. However, it is disingenuous to suggest that rule of 
law issues were the only concerns or bases for the IMT’s “criminal or-
ganization” jurisprudence. Control Council Law No. 10 was clearly tar-
geted in its substantive offences at individuals and not mass prosecu-
tion. Even membership crimes were defined in terms of individual 
membership in the organizations. The limitations in time, and on what 
we might call the mens rea element in relation to individual awareness 
of the organization’s goals and practices, did more than eliminate the 
possibility: they also reinforced the Tribunal’s overall jurisprudence and 
reflected the IMT’s somewhat limited understanding of the structures 
and apparatuses of the Nazi state. In effect, by placing the September 1, 
1939 limit on the declarations of organizational criminality, the IMT 
handcuffed the NMT’s ability to convict under the membership crime 
provision of Control Council Law No. 10. Because the NMT was not 
bound by the dependent nature of the definition of crimes against hu-
manity from the Nuremberg Charter, it was free to consider acts com-
mitted after the Nazi rise to power in 1933, acts committed against 
German nationals, without having to tie those crimes to a common plan 
or conspiracy that the IMT had determined had commenced only in 
1937-1938. 
But because of the limitations imposed by the narrow findings of 
 
 180. Id. at 693. 
 181. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 104 (U.S. Gov’t 
Printing Office 1949). 
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the IMT in relation to the organizations, the NMT and other tribunals 
could not consider “membership crimes” before September 1, 1939. 
Thus, it could, and did, find that the criminal justice system, the police 
apparatus, the sterilization and euthanasia programs, as well as the rein-
dustrialization and rearmament of Germany before 1937–1938 consti-
tuted international crimes. But they could not find the perpetrators of 
those crimes guilty of membership crimes before the IMT’s artificial 
date. This meant, and means, that while the NMT was able to create a 
different constitutional understanding of the Nazi state and its interna-
tional criminality that was created by the IMT, it could not give full 
force and effect to that criminality and the apparatus and structures that 
enabled and aided and abetted it, because of the apparently artificial 
limits of the IMT jurisprudence. 
Richard Arens echoed Taylor’s concerns about the scale and scope 
of war criminality facing Allied Occupation authorities at the end of the 
war, stating that “The world was presented with the spectacle of the un-
precedented scale of direct and indirect participation in the commission 
of that crime on broad, popular levels.”182 Arens argued that the need for 
group sanctions in this postwar context flowed not just from the extent 
of criminality, but from a cultural demand, based on a broad under-
standing of the nature of Nazi criminality, for the “punishment” of 
groups at the heart of the Hitler regime.183 He concluded that such moral 
imperatives were quickly moved to one side by the growing demand, in 
the context of the Cold War in particular, but also, more widely with the 
practical need to end the prosecutions and reconstruct Germany.184  To 
Arens, 
Abandonment of such prosecution under Allied auspices as author-
ized by the Nuremberg Charter embodied a body-blow to democratic 
doctrine and practice within Germany and the outside world. The 
harmful results of this abandonment are all too apparent. The effec-
tiveness of any machinery for prosecution of Nazi criminality rested 
inevitably upon the use of group sanctions judiciously administered. 
Rejection of group sanctions meant the collapse of the only effective 
machinery for prosecution possible under Allied Western auspices 
and concomitantly therewith, the resurgence of Nazism in Germany. 
The tragi-comedy of an attempted prosecution under German auspi-
 
 182. Richard Arens, Nuremberg and Group Prosecution, 1951 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 330 
(1951).  
 183. Id. at 334–39. 
 184. Id. at 353.  
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ces need not be dignified with a formal discussion.185 
Thus, for Arens and for the prosecution forces, the failure to pur-
sue declarations of criminality against other groups and to fully imple-
ment the understandings of the Nazi state and its apparatus that in-
formed the entire prosecution of the so-called “criminal organizations” 
had profound significance beyond the absence of strict criminal sanc-
tions. While Biddle recognized the effect of the declarations by the IMT 
at the psychological level, according to Arens, he did not understand the 
full absence of effect stemming from the IMT jurisprudence or the 
broader Allied legal strategy of abandoning group prosecutions.186  Not 
only did this position mean that many war criminals escaped personal 
liability, but it also led to the ideological conclusion (and the psycholog-
ical effect of this for the German public) excluding many organizations 
and groups from an understanding of the nature of the Nazi regime, its 
apparatuses and structures, and the constitutional character of the Hitler 
state. 
I am not suggesting that we must necessarily accept the constitu-
tional normativity of a “criminal state” advanced by the prosecution at 
the IMT, confirmed by the Soviet dissent, or concretized by the further 
prosecutions under Control Council Law No. 10.187 However, this sug-
gests that the different positions adopted throughout the IMT, NMT, 
and Allied Occupation of Germany more generally, has left us with con-
fused understandings of the nature of the Nazi state and of the place of 
law and lawyers in the apparatus of that regime. Postwar studies agree 
generally that there was a “dictatorship” in Germany between 1933 and 
1945, but they offer little by way of convincing argument or historical, 
political, ideological agreement over just what that broad category 
means. For some, the idea of a Nazi dictatorship fits more broadly into 
an analysis of totalitarianism in which similarities, and indeed identity, 
must be found between brown and red totalitarian regimes, between the 
Soviet Union under Stalin and Germany under Hitler.188 Others seek 
more specific understandings of the Hitler state, but again without any 
contextualized or worthwhile theory or analysis of law, legality, or con-
stitutionalism to help us understand the Nazi regime as a juridical phe-
 
 185. Id. at 356.  
 186. See generally Burchard, supra note 10. 
 187. Indeed, I specifically reject this account of the Nazi state and of Nazi legality. See gen-
erally LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ, supra note 9. 
 188. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Mariner Books 
1948).  
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nomenon.189 
Perhaps by taking the issues of Nazi law and Nazi constitutional-
ism seriously and by examining these ideas carefully and in the full nar-
rative context of Occupation law and practice in relation to the ques-
tions arising from the notion of “criminal organizations” at the IMT, we 
might begin to develop a jurisprudence of the Nazi state. This is im-
portant in terms of our own understandings of the past and current im-
plication of the Nazi state, generally, and a juridified Holocaust in par-
ticular in the legal lifeworld.190 It is also important because we live in a 
world where some of the most vital and dangerous issues of internation-
al law and international relations revolve around so-called rogue states. 
In describing the foundational and constitutive issues at the heart 
of this phenomenon, Jacques Derrida explores the understanding that 
flows from the use of the term “rogue,” (and its French “equivalent 
“voyou”). 
We do not know whether it should be, as a substantive, linked by a 
hyphen to the substantive state, thereby indicating that some state is 
substantially a voyou and thus would deserve to disappear as a non-
constitutional state or state of nonlaw, or whether voyou is an attrib-
ute, the quality temporarily attributed out of some strategic motiva-
tion by certain states to some other state that, from some point of 
view or in some context, during a limited period of time, would be 
exhibiting voyou behavior, appearing not to respect the mandates of 
international law, the prevailing rules and the force of law of interna-
tional deontology, such as the so-called legitimate and law-abiding 
states interpret them in accordance with their own interests.191 
With very few modifications, Derrida could well be describing the 
conflicts that emerged in relation to the Nazi state, Nazi law, constitu-
tional theory and “criminal organizations” at the IMT. The jurispruden-
tial issues still confront us, and will continue to confront us in the ab-
sence of a fuller engagement with the historical, juridical, and 
philosophical legacy of the Nazi state after Nuremberg. 
 
 
 189. See generally SIR IAN KERSHAW, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP: PROBLEMS AND 
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 190. See generally THE HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE AND THE LAW, supra note 3. 
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trans., Michael Naas trans., Stan. Univ. Press 2005).  
